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This work is motivated by our collaboration with a large Consumer Packaged Goods (CPG) company. We
have found that while they appreciate the advantages of dynamic pricing, they deem it operationally much
easier to plan out a static price calendar in advance.
In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of static control policies for dynamic revenue management
problems. In these problems, a firm has limited inventory to sell over a finite time horizon where demand is
known but stochastic. We consider both pricing and assortment controls, and derive simple static policies in
the form of a price calendar or a planned sequence of assortments, respectively. We show that our policies
are within 1-1/e (approximately 0.63) of the optimum under stationary (IID) demand, and 1/2 of optimum
under non-stationary demand, with both guarantees approaching 1 if the starting inventory is large.
A main contribution of this work is developing a system of tools for establishing best-possible performance
guarantees relative to linear programming relaxations: in the stationary setting, structural properties about
static policies which provide a complete characterization of tight bounds; and in the non-stationary setting,
an adaptation of the prophet inequalities from optimal stopping theory to pricing and assortment problems.
Finally, we demonstrate on data from the CPG company that our simple price calendars are effective.
1. Introduction
We consider the following general revenue management problem. A firm has finite inventory of
multiple items to sell over a finite time horizon. The starting inventory are unreplenishable and
exogenously given, having been determined by supply chain constraints or a higher-level manage-
rial decision. The firm can control its sales through sequential decisions in the form of accept-
ing/rejecting customer requests, pricing, or adjusting the assortment of items offered. Its objective
is to maximize the cumulative revenue earned before the time horizon or inventory runs out.
We consider the setting where customer demand is distributionally-known and independent over
the time horizon; this can be estimated from, e.g., the historical sales data of our partner Consumer
Packaged Goods (CPG) company. The literature has also considered other settings, where an
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2unknown IID demand distribution (Besbes and Zeevi 2009, Agrawal et al. 2017) or an evolving
demand process correlated across time (Araman and Caldentey 2009, Ciocan and Farias 2012)
must be dynamically learned, to list a few references. In our setting, the firm’s decision at one point
in time has no impact on its estimate of the demand at another point in time, which is supported
by our data (see Section 1.4 and Section 6 for more discussion). Instead, the time periods are
linked by the inventory constraints, and the firm must trade off between revenue-centric decisions
which maximize expected revenue irrespective of inventory consumption, and inventory-centric
decisions which maximize the yield from the remaining inventory. Revenue-centric decisions tend
to be myopic and maximize the sales volumes of the most popular items, while inventory-centric
decisions tend to be conservative and charge higher prices or prioritize selling highly-stocked items.
Intuitively, the optimal control policy would make revenue-centric decisions when the overall
remaining inventory is plentiful for the remaining time horizon, and inventory-centric decisions
when the overall remaining inventory is scarce relative to the remaining time horizon. However,
not all firms have the infrastructure to query the state of its inventory in real-time and adjust its
decisions accordingly. In the case of the CPG company we are working with, it is of great operational
benefit for their brick-and-mortar stores to set a price calendar far in advance, before any sales are
realized, which allows their marketing team to design flyers and advertisements accordingly.
In this paper, we derive static (or non-adaptive) policies, which must plan out all of the firm’s
decisions at the start of the time horizon, for revenue management problems that are intrinsically
dynamic, where the optimal policy should adapt to the realized inventory state. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our policies on data provided by the CPG company. Our policies are also structurally
very simple, and have performance guarantees comparable to their dynamic counterparts.
1.1. Models Considered
We partition the time horizon into a discrete number of time periods. This does not lose generality,
since a continuous time horizon can be modeled by the limiting case where the time periods are
arbitrarily granular. Similarly, we model each item as having discrete “prices points” at which it
could be sold. This allows us to both approximate a continuous price range and capture situations
where fixed price points have been pre-determined by market standards.
Throughout this paper, we will consider two models which differ in the type of decision made
by the firm.
1. Single-item Pricing: There is a single item with a discrete starting inventory. We are given,
for each time period t and each feasible price p, the probability qt(p) of earning a sale if price
p is offered during time t. The goal is to plan, for each time period t, the price to offer during
time t, with no sales occurring if inventory has stocked out. We also generalize our results to
3the fractional-demand setting, where the demand distribution given for each time t and price
p is over the continuous interval [0,1] (after normalizing), and the sales at a time period is the
minimum of the realized demand and remaining inventory.
2. Assortment (and Pricing): There are multiple items each with a discrete starting inventory.
We are given, for each time period t and each assortment S of items which could be offered
(as well as corresponding prices), the probability of selling each item in S during time t. We
assume that these choice probabilities satisfy a substitutability condition (see Section 2.1),
which is very mild and standard in the literature. The goal is to plan out the assortment of
items (and prices) to offer during each time period t, with no sales occurring if the customer
chooses an item that has stocked out.
These two prototypical models capture most controls used in revenue management, including
the case where the firm’s decision is to accept/reject customer requests (Talluri and Van Ryzin
2006, Maglaras and Meissner 2006). The single-item pricing problem with discrete prices and
{0,1}-demand is a special case of the assortment problem with pricing. Nonetheless, we consider it
separately, because the optimal static policy satisfies additional structural properties in this special
case, and the generalization to [0,1]-demand is what we will apply on the data provided by the
CPG company.
Finally, we will consider the following two demand models separately, because the design of
effective policies changes significantly when the demand is stationary (IID).
1. Stationary: the demand distribution for a specific decision, e.g. the purchase probability
qt(p) associated with price p, is identical for all time periods t.
2. Non-stationary: the demand distribution for any decision can vary arbitrarily over time
(but still independent across t).
1.2. Differences between our Static Policies and Existing Policies
Our policies are based on a deterministic linear program (see Section 2.2 for details), which can
be formulated for a given problem instance (items, inventory, prices, and demand distributions)
in advance, and hence be used to derive static policies. At a high level, the LP uses deterministic
values to approximate the random execution of a policy, and we can use its optimal solution as a
“guide” in designing actual policies.
Such an LP was first used for the single-item pricing problem under stationary demand (Gallego
and Van Ryzin 1994). It is known1 that in the general non-degenerate case, an optimal LP solution
will suggest two prices pH, pL to be offered for fractions α,1−α of the time horizon, respectively. Our
1 This fact also originated from Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), although it is not to be confused with their result in
the continuous-price, regular-demand-function setting, which says that the LP suggests a single price.
4static policy is to simply offer the higher price pH for the first α-fraction of the time horizon, and
offer the lower price pL for the remaining time horizon (rounding as necessary to fit the discrete time
periods). By contrast, the policy originally proposed for this situation by Gallego and Van Ryzin
(1994, Sec. 4) allowed the prices pH, pL to be offered in either order, but required the switching
point to be dynamically determined based on the realized inventory levels. We show that if the
switching point must be fixed in advance, then only the high-to-low ordering of prices is effective.
For the assortment problem under stationary demand, we propose a similar static policy which
follows the choice-based deterministic LP originating from Gallego et al. (2004), in this case prob-
abilistically. The choice-based LP can in general be solved efficiently despite having exponentially-
many variables, and we defer discussion about such methods to Cheung and Simchi-Levi (2016).
Moving to non-stationary demand, we can no longer directly follow the LP solution. In fact, we
may want to modify certain decisions suggested by the LP to ensure that sufficient inventory is
“reserved” for higher-revenue time periods (see Example 1). To accomplish this, we introduce a
bid price ci for each item i, which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of a unit of item i’s
inventory. Our bid prices ci are based on the non-stationary LP, but end up being time-invariant
(i.e. independent of t).
In the single-item pricing problem, letting c denote the bid price of the single item, our static
policy is to greedily maximize the expected “profit” under cost c. That is, our policy sets the price
at each time t to be arg maxp(p− c) · qt(p). Policies based on bid prices are common in revenue
management, and the papers by Adelman (2007), Rusmevichientong et al. (2017) imply static
policies for our problem which take the same form. The difference is in the computation of the bid
prices, where their bid prices are time-varying and based on approximate dynamic programming,
while our bid prices are time-invariant and based on the LP.
In the assortment problem under non-stationary demand, our static policy is to take the LP
solution, remove from the suggested assortments all instances where an item i is offered at a price
less than ci, and then follow the modified solution. In doing so, we are treating ci as an acceptance
threshold instead of a bid price. Our policy is similar to those of Wang et al. (2015), Gallego et al.
(2016), in that it probabilistically imitates the LP solution and independently determines for each
item i when to discard it from the assortment. However, our discarding rule is static and based on
a fixed ci, whereas their discarding rule is dynamic and based on the realized inventory levels.
1.3. Performance Guarantees and Analytical Techniques
We establish performance guarantees for our static policies which, in many cases, improve existing
guarantees even for dynamic policies. All of our guarantees are ratios relative to the optimal LP
objective value, which is an upper bound on the performance of any static or dynamic policy.
5Table 1 Lower bounds on the performance of static and dynamic policies. Our new results (in Section 2.4) are bolded.
Dynamic Policies Static Policies
Stationary Demand 1− 1/e w/ error rate O(1/
√
b)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b→∞
1 1− 1/e w/ error rate O(1/
√
b)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b→∞
1
(Properties) adaptive switching point static switching point
either H to L or L to H only from H to L
Single-item Pricing/Assignment [Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994)] [Theorem 1]
Assortment (and Pricing) [Liu and Van Ryzin (2008); Theorem 2] [Theorem 2]
Single-item, Fractional Demand [Theorem 1]
Non-stationary Demand 1/2 1/2
Single-item Pricing/Assignment [Wang et al. (2015)] [Rusmevichientong et al. (2017);
Assortment (and Pricing) [Gallego et al. (2016)] Theorems 3–4]
Single-item, Fractional Demand [Theorem 3]
Non-stationary Demand
w/ error rate O(1/
√
b)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b→∞
1
w/ error rate O(
√
log b/b)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b→∞
1
Single-item Pricing/Assignment [Wang et al. (2015)] [Hajiaghayi et al. (2007); Theorem 5]
Assortment (and Pricing) [Gallego et al. (2016)] [Theorem 6]
Single-item, Fractional Demand [Theorem 5]
Note: b refers to the amount of starting inventory (or the smallest starting inventory, if there are multiple items).
Our results are outlined in Table 1. The baseline performance ratio is 1 − 1/e for stationary
demand and 1/2 for non-stationary demand. That is, our static policies always earn at least 50% of
the optimum in expectation, with the ratio improving to ≈ 63.2% if the given demand distributions
are stationary. Both of these ratios are tight. The ratios also increase to 100% as b, the starting
inventory level when demand has been normalized to lie in [0,1] (or in the assortment setting, the
minimum starting inventory among the items), increases to ∞.
In the stationary-demand pricing problem, Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) have previously derived
both the lower bound of 1− 1/e and an asymptotic-optimality result. However, their policy is in
general dynamic, unless the demand function is regular over a continuous interval. By contrast, we
show that the same results can be obtained using a static policy, regardless of demand regularity
Also, in our analysis, we derive the tightest possible bound for every value of b and T (the number
of time periods), which allows us to establish asymptotic optimality in only b. To our knowledge,
existing analyses in the revenue management literature have scaled both T →∞ and b→∞ to get
an asymptotic optimality result.
In the stationary-demand assortment problem, we obtain the exact same bounds which are tight
in b and T . To our knowledge, this type of result, which includes the baseline lower bound of
61− 1/e when starting inventory is 1, has been previously unknown2 for the assortment problem.
Asymptotic optimality has been previously derived by Liu and Van Ryzin (2008) for their dynamic
policy when both T →∞ and b→∞.
Moving to non-stationary demand, the lower bound of 1/2 which improves to 1 as b→∞ has
been previously established using dynamic policies, in the assignment problem of Wang et al.
(2015) and the more general assortment problem of Gallego et al. (2016). We establish the same
bounds using static policies, with an extremely simple analysis based on prophet inequalities from
optimal stopping theory. However, our convergence rate of 1−O(√(log b)/b) is worse than the rate
of 1−O(1/√b) achievable by their dynamic policies.
We should mention that the lower bound of 1/2 for static policies under non-stationary demand
has also been recently established by Rusmevichientong et al. (2017). Their bound and analysis
differ from ours in that they are relative to the optimal dynamic policy instead of the deterministic
LP relaxation. One benefit of using the LP is it directly extends to the fractional-demand setting,
since the LP does not change when demand can take any value in [0,1], which is our application
of interest with the CPG company. By contrast, their framework is designed for a very general
setting where resources can be reused after a random amount of time.
The asymptotic optimality result of single-item pricing under non-stationary {0,1} demand has
been studied by Hajiaghayi et al. (2007). Their bound has dependence on both b and T , with
a convergence rate of 1 − O(
√
log bT
b
). If T = ω(b2) then they have to assume bounded purchase
probability from the newly emerging demands. Our bound has only dependence on b, and extends
to both fractional-demand setting and assortment setting.
We now outline the new analytical techniques we used in deriving the results in Table 1.
1. Stationary Demand (Sections 3 and 5): We establish a sequence of three inequalities in
Section 3 (four inequalities in Section 5) about single-item pricing policies which: (i) relate the
LP optimum to the expected revenue of a static policy which randomly offers two prices; (ii)
use a strengthened “monotonicity” argument to show that revenue does not decrease if we sort
the prices from high-to-low; and (iii) relate the high-to-low calendar to our suggested policy.
These inequalities motivate a complete characterization of tight bounds under stationary
demand, which also hold for the assortment problem.
2. Non-stationary Demand (Section 4): We adapt prophet inequalities from optimal stopping
theory to pricing and assortment problems. Specifically, motivated by the clever analysis of
the fixed-threshold stopping policy from Samuel-Cahn et al. (1984), we derive time-invariant
thresholds based on our LP’s which allow us to balance between selling too little and selling
2 The results in Golrezaei et al. (2014) imply performance guarantees for our problem, but their ratios are smaller
than ours, since they are designed to hold under the more general setting of adversarial demand.
7too much in the analysis. The result is a very short and interpretable proof of the tight
1/2-optimality result for revenue management problems under non-stationary demand. Our
analysis differs from Samuel-Cahn et al. (1984) in the following ways: for pricing, our algorithm
optimizes with respect to a cost (instead of using it as a threshold); for both pricing and
assortment, our costs set to 1/2 of the LP (instead of the median of the value distribution in
the optimal stopping problem)—our analysis is derived by transforming the optimal stopping
analysis of Samuel-Cahn et al. (1984) to allow for pricing and assortment via the equivalence
observed by Maglaras and Meissner (2006).
1.4. Application on Data from CPG Company
We use aggregated weekly sales data from a CPG company to validate our model, and test the
performance of our proposed policies. We use random forest to build prediction models that suggest
demand distributions (normalized to lie in [0,1], possibly fractional numbers) under different prices.
Then we take these distributions as inputs, and numerically compare the performance of our policies
to some basic benchmarks.
Figure 1 Work flow: from data to prediction model
Working together with the CPG company, we have used the work flow depicted in Figure 1
to build our demand model. The average out-of-sample percent-error in its sales predictions is
19.41%. It is worth highlighting the features selected by the random forest: the tagged price,
external competitor prices, and some external features such as seasonality. However, neither internal
competitor prices (the prices of other SKU’s of the CPG company) nor historical prices were
selected. This observation validates our model in the following two aspects: internal competitor
prices not being selected suggests that we can separately optimize the price calendar for each single
item; historical prices not being selected suggests that demand can be modeled as independent
over time. The latter aspect is also validated by a stream of empirical literature on the “pantry
effect” (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998, Bell et al. 1999) which observes for various consumable goods
that if customers attempt to stockpile it when the price is low, then they end up consuming it
more quickly, and hence the low price did not necessarily cannibalize future demand.
8Optimizing the price calendar based on our demand model, we find that for scenarios where
the starting inventory is of moderate size compared to the total expected demand (i.e. for SKU’s
that were neither overstocked nor understocked initially), our static policies outperform basic LP-
based static policies by 5% under stationarity, and 1% under non-stationarity. Furthermore, our
static policies lose at most 1% under stationarity, and 4% under non-stationarity, compared to the
optimal dynamic policies.
More details about our demand modeling and calendar optimization with data from the CPG
company can be found in Section EC.1.
1.5. Other Related Work
A direct comparison of our contributions in relation to the existing literature has already been
presented in Section 1.3, so here we briefly mention a few previously unmentioned papers. Inventory-
constrained assortment optimization was pioneered by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) and has also
been studied in Zhang and Adelman (2009) using approximate dynamic programming. Regarding
choice of optima, in this paper we use the DLP (and CDLP), but there are other notions of optima
(hindsight optimum, optimal dynamic program) used in the revenue management literature—for
a discussion, see Bumpensanti and Wang (2018), Ma et al. (2018a).
2. Model and Notation
Let N denote the positive integers. For any positive integer n, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
2.1. Definitions of Problems
A firm has n ∈ N items to sell over a finite time horizon of T ∈ N time periods. Each item i is
endowed with bi ∈N units of starting inventory, which is unreplenishable. The firm can offer items
at one of m ∈ N prices p1, . . . , pm, which are positive real numbers. The assumption that items
share a common set of prices is without loss of generality, because we can always take the union
of feasible prices and assign zero demand for infeasible item-price pairs.
In the single-item pricing problem, we have n= 1, and we will omit index i. For each t ∈ [T ]
and j ∈ [m], we are given qtj, the probability of earning a sale if price pj is offered during time t.
If demand is stationary, then qtj has a common value over t, which we will denote using qj.
At the start of the time horizon, the firm sets a price pjt for each time period, where jt is a price
index in [m]. Then, the demand Qt is sequentially realized over time periods t= 1, . . . , T , taking
values in {0,1} according to probability qtjt . If Qt = 1 and there is remaining inventory at time t,
then revenue pjt is earned and the inventory is decremented by one for the future.
In the more general fractional-demand setting, the starting inventory b can be any positive real
number. If a demand of Qt ∈ [0,1] is realized while the remaining inventory is B, then min{Qt,B}
9sales are made during time period t, at the price of pjt . In this setting, qtj refers to the expected
demand from offering price pj during time t, and Qtj refers to the random demand from offering
price pj during time t, where we have normalized the starting inventory and demand so that every
Qt can only take values in [0,1]. Let Ftj(·),∀j ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ] denote the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of Qtj. Let Ft(·),∀j ∈ [m] denote the CDF of Qt.
In the basic setting where demand conforms to the Bernoulli distribution ({0,1} demand), we will
require no assumptions. But we will require two assumptions for [0,1] demand. One is analogous
to vertical differentiation, and the other involves the expectation of truncated variables.
The generalization to [0,1]-demand gives us a lot of modeling power. The dynamic pricing litera-
ture (e.g. see Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006)) has focused on the case
of Bernoulli demand because the firm can control the price with arbitrary granularity and hence
ensure that at most one sale occurs during any “time period”. However, in the case of our CPG
company, they can only control prices at the week level, during which the demand distribution can
range anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand.
In the assortment (and pricing) problem, we will refer to each item-price combination (i, j)
as a product. We let S denote the family of feasible assortments, or subsets of products, which
could be offered by the firm. S can capture constraints that prevent the an item from being offered
multiple times (at different prices) in an assortment, as well as operational logistics such as shelf-
size constraints. For each t ∈ [T ], S ∈ S, and (i, j) ∈ S, we are given qt(i, j,S), the probability of
product (i, j) being chosen should assortment S be offered during time t. If demand is stationary,
then qt(i, j,S) has a common value over t, which we will denote using q(i, j,S).
At the start of the time horizon, the firm plans an assortment St ∈ S for each time period.
Sequentially over time t= 1, . . . , T , up to one product (It, Jt) is chosen from St, according to choice
probabilities qt(i, j,St). If item It has remaining inventory, then one unit is sold for revenue Jt.
Otherwise, the sale is lost.3
Our results will require the following assumption, which allows products to be judiciously with-
held from assortment offerings without harming the demand for other products in the assortment.
Assumption 1. S is a downward-closed family of subsets of {(i, j) : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}. That is, if
S ∈ S and S′ ⊆ S, then S′ ∈ S. Furthermore, for all t ∈ [T ], S ∈ S, subsets S′ ⊆ S, and products
(i, j)∈ S′, qt(i, j,S′)≥ qt(i, j,S).
Assumption 1 is very mild, originating from Golrezaei et al. (2014) and being nearly omnipresent in
subsequent literature on inventory-constrained assortment optimization (Gallego et al. 2016, Chen
3 This convention, motivated by e.g. parking systems where customers frequently choose “phantom” parking spots
that are actually occupied, is also adopted in Rusmevichientong et al. (2017), Owen and Simchi-Levi (2017).
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et al. 2016, Ma and Simchi-Levi 2017, Rusmevichientong et al. 2017, Ma et al. 2018b, Cheung et al.
2018). The condition on the choice probabilities is often called substitutability. It is implied by any
random-utility choice model, which would treat the products as substitutes.
2.2. (Choice-based) Deterministic Linear Programs
A policy for the single-item pricing problem can be captured by the following LP:
JDLP−N = max
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
pjqtjxtj (1)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
qtjxtj ≤ b (2)
m∑
j=1
xtj ≤ 1 ∀ t= 1, . . . , T (3)
xtj ≥ 0 ∀ t= 1, . . . , T ; ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m (4)
xtj represents the unconditional probability of price pj being offered during time t. Constraint (2)
ensures that at most b sales are made in expectation, while constraints (3) ensure that only one
price can be chosen for each time period. Objective (1) represents the expected revenue.
Similarly, a policy for the assortment problem can be captured by the following LP:
JCDLP−N = max
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
xt(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjqt(i, j,S) (5)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
xt(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
qt(i, j,S)≤ bi ∀ i= 1, . . . , n (6)∑
S∈S
xt(S)≤ 1 ∀ t= 1, . . . , T (7)
xt(S)≥ 0 ∀ t= 1, . . . , T ; ∀ S ∈ S (8)
Under stationary demand, both LP’s can be simplified. In the pricing problem, since qtj = qj for
all t, we can let xj = x1j + . . .+xTj for each j, which represents the number of time periods to offer
price pj; constraints (3) are then equivalent to the single constraint (9), as in the following LP.
JDLP−S = max
m∑
j=1
pjqjxj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
qjxj ≤ b
m∑
j=1
xj ≤ T (9)
xj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m
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Analogously, in the assortment problem, since qt(i, j,S) = q(i, j,S) for all t, we can let x(S) =
x1(S) + . . .+xT (S) for each S, which represents the number of time periods to offer assortment S;
constraints (7) are then equivalent to the single constraint (10).
JCDLP−S = max
∑
S∈S
x(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S)
s.t.
∑
S∈S
x(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
q(i, j,S)≤ bi ∀ i= 1, . . . , n∑
S∈S
x(S)≤ T (10)
x(S)≥ 0 ∀ S ∈ S
The LP for pricing under stationary demand also has the following structure.
Lemma 1 (Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994)). The DLP-S defined by (1), (2), (9), and (4)
has a basic optimal solution (x∗j )
m
j=1 with at most two non-zeros in its support, which we will denote
using x∗H (“Higher price”) and x
∗
L (“Lower price”), with pH ≥ pL. Furthermore, the optimal solution
satisfies one of the following:
1. Constraints (2) and (9) are both binding;
2. Constraint (2) is binding but (9) is not, in which case x∗H = b/qH, x
∗
L = 0, and H∈ arg maxj pj;
3. Constraint (9) is binding but (2) is not, in which case x∗H = 0, x
∗
L = T , and L∈ arg maxj pjqj.
Generally, these LP’s are useful because they portray a relaxation of the optimal policy, and
hence an optimal LP solution can be used as a “guide” in designing a policy for the corresponding
problem. In this paper, we will focus on converting the LP solution into a static policy. However, as
we will see in Section 2.4, such a procedure allow us to compare our static policy’s revenue against
even the best dynamic policies.
2.3. Definitions of Static Policies
Definition 1. Single-item pricing policy (for both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) when demand is
stationary :
i) Solve DLP-S, and let pH, pL, x
∗
H, x
∗
L correspond to an optimal solution as described in Lemma 1;
ii) Set the price to be pH for t= 1, . . . , s
∗ and pL for t= s∗+1, . . . , T , where the duration for which
the lower price is offered, equals to T − s∗, is either bx∗Lc or dx∗Le. 4
Our policy offers the prices in high-to-low order, with a static switching point. Intuitively, the high-
to-low ordering is desirable, because should we stock out early from higher-than-expected demand
realizations, we would rather lose low-priced sales at the end.
4 We define s∗ based on x∗L instead of x
∗
H, becaues x
∗
L can span the full range of values from 0 to T , unlike x
∗
H (see
Lemma 1).
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Definition 2. Assortment (and pricing) policy when demand is stationary :
i) Solve CDLP-S, and let {x∗(S) : S ∈ S} denote an optimal solution;
ii) Independently for each time t, set the assortment St to be S with probability proportional to
x∗(S), for all S ∈ S. 5
Our assortment policy simply probabilistically follows the LP solution, without specifically re-
ordering the decisions portrayed in the LP. Here we do not have a high-to-low order, because it is
hard to define a “higher” assortment when there are multiple items.
However, under the more general setting of non-stationary demand, following the LP solution
may be undesirable, because it may be beneficial to “reserve” inventory for the highest-revenue
time periods. The following example demonstrates this.
Example 1. Let there be T = 2 periods and b = 1 unit of initial inventory. Let  ∈ (0,1) be
some small positive number. Let there be two prices: p1 = 1/
2, p2 = 1. During day 1, the purchase
probability of offering the higher price p1 is 0; and the purchase probability of offering the lower
price p2 is 1 − . During day 2, the purchase probability of offering both prices are . DLP-N
Prices Period 1 Period 2
p1 0 
p2 1−  
suggests that we offer p2 in the first period, then p1 in the second period. The objective value of
DLP-N is (1−)+ · 1
2
= 1−+ 1

. By simply using the DLP-N solution as a calendar, the expected
revenue is (1− ) +  ·  · 1
2
= 2− . We can pick  to be arbitrarily small so directly using LP can
be arbitrarily bad.
Nonetheless, we can still use the LP as a guide for our reservation policies.
Definition 3. Single-item pricing policy (for both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) when demand is
non-stationary :
i) Solve DLP-N, and let r∗ denote the optimal objective value;
ii) For each time t, set the price to be pjt , where
jt ∈ arg max
j
(pj − r
∗
2b
)qtj. (11)
In (11), r∗/b can be interpreted as the per-inventory revenue of the LP. The policy from Definition 3
is guaranteed to sell inventory for at least half of this value, since at each time t, it maximizes the
expected profit with a bid price (opportunity cost) of r∗/(2b).
5 If
∑
S∈S x
∗(S) = 1 then this is already a probability; if
∑
S∈S x
∗(S)< 1 then we divide each x∗(S) by
∑
S∈S x
∗(S)
to normalize their sum to one.
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Definition 4. Assortment (and pricing) policy when demand is non-stationary, but under
Assumption 1:
i) Solve CDLP-N, and let {x∗t (S) : t∈ [T ], S ∈ S} denote an optimal solution;
ii) For each item i, let r∗i =
∑T
t=1
∑
S∈S x
∗
t (S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S pjqt(i, j,S) be the contribution from item
i to the optimal objective value (note that OPTLP =
∑n
i=1 r
∗
i );
iii) Independently for each time t, first randomly select a S˜t, to be equal to each S ∈ S with
probability x∗t (S), which is a proper probability distribution by constraint (7). If
∑
S x
∗
t (S)< 1,
then select S˜t to be the empty set ∅ with the remaining probability, where ∅ ∈ S is guaranteed
by the downward-closed statement in Assumption 1.
After S˜t has been selected, set the final assortment to offer at time t to be
St = S \ {(i, j)∈ S : pj < r
∗
i
2bi
}, (12)
which is a feasible assortment to offer since S is downward-closed.
Our assortment policy under non-stationary demand differs from our pricing policy in that the
cost r∗i /(2bi) is used as an acceptance threshold instead of a bid price. That is, we remove from the
planned assortments all instances of items i being offered at prices below their thresholds.
Finally, we present alternative policies for non-stationary demand which conduct “reservation”
to a lesser degree than in Definitions 3–4. Our policies have better performance if starting inventory
is large, where the law of large numbers reduces the necessity of reservation, even under non-
stationary demand.
Due to the law of large numbers, one may have the mis-perception that directly using the optimal
solution from the LP, without any “reservation”, is asymptotically optimal. But we will show in
Example EC.1 that even both inventory and horizon scales up asymptotically, directly following
LP can be arbitrarily bad. This motivates the following two static policies.
Definition 5. Single-item pricing policy (for both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) when demand is
non-stationary and inventory is large:
i) Solve DLP-N, and let x∗tj denote an optimal solution;
ii) For each time t, set the price to be pj, j 6= 1 with probability x∗tj · (1− δ), and p1 (the highest
price) with probability 1−∑mj=2 x∗tj · (1− δ), where
δ=
√
3 log b
b
.
In our static policy, δ can be interpreted as the “reservation” probability, which decreases to zero
as initial inventory increases. We reserve inventory by offering the highest price p1 in each time
period. Intuitively, the probability of us offering p1 is the sum of δ the reservation probability, plus
the probability that LP suggested us to offer p1.
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Definition 6. Assortment (and pricing) policy when demand is non-stationary and inventory
is large, but under Assumption 1:
i) Solve CDLP-N, and let {x∗t (S) : t∈ [T ], S ∈ S} denote an optimal solution;
ii) For each time t, offer the asortment S with probability x∗t (S) · (1− δ), and offer ∅ ∈ S with
probability δ, where
δ=
√
3 log (mini∈[n] bi)
mini∈[n] bi
.
Again, δ can be interpreted as the “reservation” probability, which decreases to zero as initial
inventory increases. Here we reserve inventory by offering the empty set, which is always available.
2.4. Statements of Results
We derive performance guarantees for our static policies, which are based on the deterministic
LP’s from Section 2.2, relative the optimal objective values of those LP’s. This also provides a
performance guarantee relative to the revenue of any dynamic policy, which is upper-bounded by
the LP objective value—this is a well-known type of result in revenue management.
Lemma 2 (Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), Gallego et al. (2004)). The expected revenue
of any (static or dynamic) policy for the single-item pricing problem is upper-bounded by the opti-
mal objective value of DLP-N. Analogously, the expected revenue of any policy for the assortment
problem is upper-bounded by the optimal objective value of CDLP-N.
Hereinafter, we will always use the LP objective value as our optimum and denote it using OPTLP,
where the distinction between the LP’s will be clear from context.
Theorem 1. For the single-item pricing problem (both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) under sta-
tionary demand, if there are T periods to sell b units of inventory, then the static policy from
Definition 1 earns expected revenue at least
E[min{Bin(T, q), b}]
Tq
·OPTLP := ∆APX ·OPTLP, (13)
where q= min{b/T,1} and Bin(T, q) denotes a Binomial random variable consisting of T trials of
probability q (note that if q= 1, then the performance guarantee is 100%).
Expression (13) is in turn at least (
1− b
b
b!
e−b
)
·OPTLP, (14)
where the factor in parentheses has an order of 1−O(1/√b), and increasing from 1− 1/e to 1 as
b→∞.
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We prove Theorem 1 in Section 3, by establishing a sequence of three properties about the expected
revenue of static policies. We also show that the bound (13) is tight for every T and b, in that it is
the best-possible LP-relative bound achievable by any (static or dynamic) policy when there are
T time periods and b starting inventory, in Lemma 5. Bound (13) is achieved by our static policy
from Definition 1 which sorts and rounds the LP solution, and we furthermore show that sorting
in the opposite order (low-to-high) is infeasible for static policies, in Example 2.
We focus on the case of {0,1}-demand in Section 3, for clarity. The details of the generalization
to fractional demand is deferred to Section 5, where we will require some additional assumptions
on the demand distributions over [0,1].
Theorem 2. For the assortment (and pricing) problem under stationary demand, if there are T
time periods and b denotes the minimum starting inventory among b1, . . . , bn, then the static policy
from Definition 2 earns expected revenue at least the expression given in (13).
Theorem 2 is motivated by the first property from the proof of Theorem 1, and we prove it in
Section 3.4.
Theorem 3. For the single-item pricing problem (both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) where demand
may be non-stationary, the static policy from Definition 3 earns expected revenue at least OPTLP/2.
Theorem 4. For the assortment (and pricing) problem where demand may be non-stationary,
the static policy from Definition 4 earns expected revenue at least OPTLP/2.
We prove Theorem 3 (for general [0,1]-demand) and Theorem 4 in Section 4. Although the pricing
policy employs a bid price while the assortment policy employs acceptance thresholds, the analyses
are similar, using the technique of prophet inequalities.
Theorem 5. For the single-item pricing problem (both {0,1}- and [0,1]-demand) where demand
may be non-stationary, the static policy from Definition 5 earns expected revenue at least(
1−
√
3 log b
b
)
OPTLP, i.e. it earns as much as the optimal dynamic pricing policy when initial
inventory goes to infinity.
Theorem 6. For the assortment (and pricing) policy where demand may be non-stationary,
the static policy from Definition 6 earns revenue that is at least
(
1−
√
3 log (mini∈[n] bi)
mini∈[n] bi
)
OPTLP in
expectation, i.e. it earns as much as the optimal dynamic pricing policy when initial inventory of
any item goes to infinity.
We prove Theorems 5-6 for large starting inventory in Section 4.1.
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3. Stationary Demand
The focus of this section is to prove Theorem 1, our result for single-item pricing under station-
ary demand, in the {0,1}-demand case. The extension to [0,1]-demand is proven in Section 5.
Meanwhile, Theorem 2, our assortment result under stationary demand, is proven in Section 3.4.
3.1. Structural Property: Monotinicity
We quickly establish a structural property, Lemma 3, as a warm-up to the proof of Lemma 4,
although Lemma 4 is going to be proved in a self-contained fashion. Let vt ∈ [m] denote the price
index for time t in a calendar, and v∗t ∈ [m] the optimal price index in a revenue-maximizing
calendar. We use v to describe the calendar, a vector of price indices. The structural property says:
Lemma 3. In any calendar v, if two consecutive price indices vt, vt+1 are such that pvt < pvt+1,
then indices vt and vt+1 can be exchanged in the calendar without decreasing its expected revenue.
The proof of Lemma 3 is deferred to Section EC.5.
Corollary 1. There exists an optimal static calendar whose prices are non-increasing over
time, i.e. pv∗t ≥ pv∗t+1 ,∀t∈ [T − 1].
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma 3. We can start from any calendar and use a finite number
(no more than T !) of exchange operations to achieve the optimal non-decreasing structure. 
3.2. Three-step Proof of Theorem 1
The proof can be divided into three steps, which we will illustrate using the following example.
Consider a problem instance with T = 3 time periods and starting inventory b = 2. Suppose we
have two prices. The higher price of 2 earns a sale with probability 1/3; the lower price of 1 earns
a sale with probability 1, i.e. deterministically. The optimal LP solution (according to Lemma 1)
suggests to offer a higher price index H for 1.5 time periods, and a lower price index L for 1.5 time
periods.
We let E[Rev(H; 0.5H,0.5L;L)] denote the expected revenue of a (randomized) static pol-
icy which offers H in the first time period, offers H and L each with half-probability
in the second time period, and finally offers L in the third time period. We define
E[Rev(H;H;L)],E[Rev(H;L;L)],E[Rev(0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L)] analogously.
We then establish the following sequence of three inequalities:
OPTLP ·
E[min{Bin(3, 2
3
),2}]
2
≤E[Rev(0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L)] (15)
≤E[Rev(H; 0.5H,0.5L;L)] (16)
≤max{E[Rev(H;H;L)],E[Rev(H;L;L)]}. (17)
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Inequality (15) relates the LP optimum to the expected revenue of a randomized policy which
independently selects either H or L (with probability 1/2 each) for each time period. The interpre-
tation of the ratio on the LHS is the following: the LP sells exactly 2 units of inventory at some
average price (which is a convex combination of pH and pL), while the randomized policy sells at
the same price a number of units equal to a truncated Binomial (which had an expectation of b
pre-truncation). The ratio
E[min{Bin(3, 23 ),2}]
2
is strictly less than 1 unless the initial inventory was
greater than the number of time periods (i.e. there is zero possibility of stockout), because the LP
is consistent, while the randomized policy is vulnerable to variance.
Inequality (16) is an argument that strengthens the monotonicity property in Lemma 3, which
says that if there is a positive probability that the static policy offers a lower price before a higher
price, then the policy can be improved. Indeed, there is a positive probability that the policy
(0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L) does so, since there is already a 1/4 chance that it offers L in
period 1 and H in period 2. Meanwhile, the randomized policy (H; 0.5H,0.5L;L) could only lead to
the calendars (H;H;L) or (H;L;L); in either case it always offers higher prices before lower prices.
The conclusion of inequality (16) is that the first policy can be changed to the second one without
lowering the revenue; note that the total expected number of time periods that both H and L are
offered is still the same (1.5 time periods each).
Finally, in inequality (17) we pick the best between the policies (H;H;L) and (H;L;L).
We now formalize inequality (16) in the following lemma. We will incorporate inequalities (15)
and (17) in the proof of Theorem 1. Let {x}= x−bxc be the fractional part of a real number x.
Lemma 4. Consider the following two calendars:
1. A calendar that offers in each period the same probabilistic mixture of two prices, i.e. a prob-
ability α of offering the higher price and a probability 1−α of offering the lower price;
2. A calendar that starts with deterministically offering the higher price for bα ·T c periods, then
in the next period offers the higher price with probability {α · T} and the lower price with
probability 1−{α ·T}, and finally switches to offering the lower price in the last d(1−α) ·T e−1
periods.
The expected revenue of the second calendar is no less than the expected revenue of the first calendar.
The proof of Lemma 4 is deferred to Section EC.6. Now we formalize the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Notice that the optimal solution of DLP-S has only no more than two
non-zero variables. If our algorithm only selects one single price, we enumerate all the
possibilities as follows:
DLP-S has either one tight constraint or two. If it has two tight constraints and has only one
non-zero variable, this suggests that qj∗ = b/T . The static policy from Definition 1 yields exactly
E [min{Bin(T, qj∗), b}]/b= ∆APX of the OPTLP upper bound.
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If there is only one tight constraint, the static policy from Definition 1 would offer the corre-
sponding price for all T time periods. In one case, the tight constraint is the inventory constraint
(the optimal solution has xj∗ satisfying qj∗xj∗ = b,xj∗ <T and all other variables being zero), which
suggests qj∗ > b/T . Therefore, the static policy from Definition 1 gets as much expected revenue as
pj∗E[min{Bin(T, qj∗), b}]≥ pj∗E[min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}] =OPTLP∆APX ,
where the last equality follows from OPTLP = pj∗b.
In the other case, the tight constraint is the time constraint (the optimal solution has xj∗ satis-
fying qj∗xj∗ < b,xj∗ = T and all other variables being zero), which suggests qj∗ < b/T . Therefore,
the static policy from Definition 1 gets as much expected revenue as
pj∗E[min{Bin(T, qj∗), b}] =pj∗Tqj∗E[min{Bin(T, qj∗), b}]
Tqj∗
≥pj∗Tqj∗E[min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}]
T (b/T )
=OPTLP∆
APX ,
where the last equality follows from OPTLP = pj∗Tqj∗ . The proof of the second line inequality is
deferred to Proposition 1, where it serves as an elegant example of Assumption 3.
If our algorithm selects two prices, we can prove the theorem in three steps. We will first
construct a two-price randomized calendar vα that achieves exactly ∆
APX fraction of the DLP-
S upper bound. Since xj∗1 + xj∗2 = T , we can divide xj∗1 and xj∗2 by T , and naturally obtain two
probabilities. This randomized calendar vα offers price j
∗
1 with probability
xj∗1
T
, and price j∗2 with
probability
xj∗2
T
, in each period.
By a coupling argument we can show that this calendar achieves exactly ∆APX fraction of the
DLP-S upper bound. Imagine there was a virtual calendar vC which in each day offers a virtual
price
xj∗1
T
pj∗1 qj∗1 +
xj∗2
T
pj∗2 qj∗2 . Under this price the purchase probability is
xj∗1
T
qj∗1 +
xj∗2
T
qj∗2 . So the
unit-earned revenue from this virtual calendar vC is
xj∗1pj∗1 qj∗1 +xj∗2pj∗2 qj∗2
xj∗1 qj∗1 +xj∗2 qj∗2
.
The units of inventory sold, under the randomized calendar vα, conforms a Bernoulli variable
with a success probability of
xj∗1
T
qj∗1 +
xj∗2
T
qj∗2 , which is exactly the same as the virtual calendar vC .
And once one unit is sold, it has a
xj∗1
qj∗1
xj∗1
qj∗1
+xj∗2
qj∗2
probability sold at price j∗1 , and a
xj∗2
qj∗2
xj∗1
qj∗1
+xj∗2
qj∗2
probability sold at price j∗2 , which means that the unit-earned revenue is exactly the same as the
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virtual calendar vC , as well. By a coupling argument we know the randomized calendar vα earns
exactly the same as the virtual calendar vC , which is
Jvα = JvC =E [min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}]
xj∗1pj∗1 qj∗1 +xj∗2pj∗2 qj∗2
xj∗1 qj∗1 +xj∗2 qj∗2
(18)
=E [min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}] OPTLP
b
=∆APXOPTLP
in expectation.
From Lemma 4, the static policy from Definition 1 achieves greater revenue than the constructed
randomized calendar Jvα , which proves the bound. 
3.3. Tightness of Results
We now show that the ratio produced in expression (13), which is dependent on b and T , is tight.
Lemma 5. For any positive integers T and b, there exists an instance of the stationary-demand
single-item pricing problem with T time periods and b starting inventory, for which the expected
revenue of any policy is upper-bounded by expression (13).
Proof. Construct the following instance. There is only one price option, i.e. m = 1. So there
only exists one calendar to sell at this single price everyday. For any given b and T , the only price
option has a purchase probability of b/T , and earns 1 unit revenue.
The LP upper bound suggests a total of b units of revenue. And the only calendar earns
E [min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}] units of revenue. So the expected revenue of the only policy is exactly
expression (13), which finishes the tightness proof. 
Also, we show that switching from a higher price to a lower price is necessary, in the sense that if
we switch from a lower price to a higher price, we may fail to achieve the bound by expression (13).
Example 2. Let there be T = 2 periods and b = 1 unit of initial inventory. Let there be two
prices: p1 = 8, p2 = 1. The corresponding purchase probabilities are: q1 = 0.1, q2 = 0.9. The LP
suggests us to offer both p1 and p2 for exactly one period. And the LP objective is OPTLP =
p1q1 · 1 + p2q2 · 1 = 1.7
We calculate the bound in expression (13): it suggests a E[min{Bin(T, b), b}]/b= 75% guarantee.
If we offer p2 in period 1 and then p1 in period 2, this earns an expected revenue of p2q2 + (1−
q2)p1q1 = 0.98, which is 0.98/1.7≈ 57.6% of the LP upper bound.
If we offer p1 in period 1 and then p2 in period 2, this earns an expected revenue of p1q1 + (1−
q1)p2q2 = 1.61, which is 1.61/1.7≈ 94.7% of the LP upper bound.
This example depicts that switching from a lower price to a higher price is worse than the
bound by expression (13), and it is even worse than the 1− 1/e≈ 63.2% ratio. On the other hand,
switching from a higher price to a lower price performs much better than that.
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3.4. Generalizing to Assortment
In the general assortment (and pricing) setting, we do not have the structural property in Lemma 3,
but we can still offer a probabilistic mixture of assortments to achieve the desired bound in Theo-
rem 2. This probabilistic mixture resembles the one in expression (18).
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the static policy from Definition 2 and let T˜ =
∑
S∈S x
∗(S).
Regardless of inventory availability at time t, the planned assortment St will be S with probability
x∗(S)/T˜ for all S ∈ S, after which the customer will attempt to purchase a product (i, j) in S
according to probabilities q(i, j,S). Therefore, the total probability of the customer attempting to
consume inventory i is
ρi :=
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
T˜
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
q(i, j,S). (19)
Note that ρi does not depend on t. By the independence of both policy decisions and customer
decisions across time, the total sales of inventory i is Binomially distributed with T trials of
probability ρi, truncated by the starting inventory bi. To summarize, the expected sales of inventory
i is E[min{Bin(T,ρi), bi}], with ρi defined as in (19), for all i∈ [n].
Now, conditional on the policy successfully selling inventory i during a time period, what is the
revenue earned in expectation? The unconditional probability of the customer purchasing at any
price j is
∑
S3(i,j)(x
∗(S)/T˜ )q(i, j,S), hence the total conditional expectation is
m∑
j=1
pj
∑
S3(i,j)(x
∗(S)/T˜ )q(i, j,S)
ρi
=
1
T˜ ρi
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S).
Summing over all i∈ [n], the expected revenue of the policy is
n∑
i=1
E[min{Bin(T,ρi), bi}]
T˜ ρi
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S).
Now, ρi ≤ bi/T˜ for all i, since the LP solution x∗(S) satisfies constraints (6). Invoking Proposition 1,
the expected revenue of our policy is lower-bounded by
n∑
i=1
E[min{Bin(T,min{ bi
T˜
,1}), bi}]
T˜ ·min{ bi
T˜
,1}
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S) (20)
≥
n∑
i=1
E[min{Bin(T,min{ bi
T
,1}), bi}]
T ·min{ bi
T
,1}
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S) (21)
≥E[min{Bin(T,min{
b1
T
, . . . , bn
T
,1}),min{b1, b2, ..., bn, T}}]
T ·min{ b1
T
, . . . , bn
T
,1}
n∑
i=1
∑
S∈S
x∗(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
pjq(i, j,S).
We explain both inequalities. The first inequality requires the fact that T˜ ≤ T , which is implied
by LP constraint (7). Analyzing the two cases separately: if bi ≥ T˜ , then the large fraction in (20)
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equals min{T, bi}/T˜ ≥ 1 while the large fraction in (21) cannot be greater than 1; otherwise, the
denominator doesn’t change from (20) to (21) while probability in the Binomial decreases. The
second inequality follows by the following argument: by rearranging the fraction in (21) and letting
αi = min{ biT ,1}, β = min{ b1T , b2T , ..., bnT ,1} we have
E[min{Bin(T,min{ bi
T
,1}), bi}]
T ·min{ bi
T
,1} =
E[min{Bin(T,min{ bi
T
,1}),min{bi, T}}]
T ·min{ bi
T
,1}
=
E[min{∑Tt=1 Ber(αi), Tαi]
Tαi
≥E[min{
∑T
t=1 Ber(β)
αi
β
, Tαi]
Tαi
=
E[min{Bin(T,β), Tβ]
Tβ
where the inequality is due to the technical Proposition 9. Finally, this completes the proof of the
theorem, because x∗(S) is an optimal LP solution. 
4. Non-stationary Demand
In this section we prove Theorems 3–6. We first prove Theorems 3–4 for non-stationary demand
and small starting inventory. We prove Theorems 5–6 for large starting inventory in Section 4.1.
By finding the price suggested by expression (11) (or expression (12) under the assortment
setting), each unit sold earns at least one-half of the per-inventory revenue of the LP. Thus, if
inventory runs out during the horizon, then we have earned in total at least one-half of the LP
upper bound. On the other hand, if inventory never runs out, then the algorithm gets the full
“opportunity” from each time period which also results in at least one-half of the LP upper bound.
In other words, setting one-half of the per-inventory revenue as a bid price is neither too high
nor too low, and results in a “win-win” situation. This argument is based on the classical prophet
inequalities from Krengel and Sucheston (1977), Samuel-Cahn et al. (1984), where we have modified
their argument for optimal stopping to the pricing and assortment settings.
First we prove Theorem 3 in the general [0,1]-demand setting; the {0,1}-demand setting is a
special case of it. The proof of Theorem 4 follows afterward.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let jt,∀t∈ [T ] denote the prices selected from expression (11). Denote the
following random variables, which depict a run of our static assortment policy from Definition 3.
• Bt: remaining inventory at the end of time t, with B0 = 0;
• Qt: the inventory at time t that customer would have demanded if price pjt is offered in time
period t, which can take any value in [0,1];
• min{Qt,Bt−1}: the actual sales at time t.
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Let Rev denote the total revenue earned by the calendar suggested in Definition 3. Then Rev can
be expressed as follows:
Rev =
T∑
t=1
pjt min{Qt,Bt−1}
=
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)min{Qt,Bt−1}+ OPTLP
2b
T∑
t=1
min{Qt,Bt−1}
∑T
t=1 min{Qt,Bt−1} is the total number of sales, equal to b−BT , where BT is the final inventory.
Therefore,
E[Rev] =
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)E[min{Qt,Bt−1}] + OPTLP
2b
(b−E[BT ])
=
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)E[min{Qt,Bt−1}] + OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
where the second equality holds because Qt is independent from Bt−1.
Now, note that the inventory level Bt is decreasing in t and that each (pat − OPTLP2b ) term is
non-negative, so we can bound each Bt−1 from below by BT . The following can then be derived:
E[Rev] =
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)E[min{Qt,Bt−1}] + OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
=
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)E[min{Qt,Bt−1} · QtBt−1
min{Qt,Bt−1}max{Qt,Bt−1} ] +
OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
≥
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)E[
QtBt−1
b
] +
OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
≥ E[BT ]
b
T∑
t=1
(pjt −
OPTLP
2b
)qtjt +
OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
≥ E[BT ]
b
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
(pj − OPTLP
2b
)qtjx
∗
tj +
OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
≥ E[BT ]
b
(
OPTLP− OPTLP
2b
· b
)
+
OPTLP
2
(1− E[BT ]
b
)
=
OPTLP
2
where the first inequality is because ∀t∈ [T ],Qt ≤ b and Bt ≤ b; second inequality is because Bt is
decreasing in t; third inequality follows from the optimality of jt in expression (11); and the fourth
inequality follows from constraint (2) in DLP-N. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Denote the following random variables, which depict a run of our static
assortment policy from Definition 4.
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• At(S): the indicator random variable for S˜t = t, recalling that S˜t was the assortment selected
before the discarding in (12) was applied. Defined for all t∈ [T ] and S ∈ S.
• Qt(i, j): the indicator random variable for the customer attempting to purchase product (i, j)
during time t. Defined for all t∈ [T ], i∈ [n], and j ∈ [m], but can only be 1 if (i, j)∈ St.
• Bt(i): the remaining inventory of item i at the end of time t. Defined for all i ∈ [n] and
t= 0, . . . , T , where B0(i) = bi for all i. Note that if t > 0, then for all i,
Bt(i) =Bt−1(i)−1(Bt−1(i)> 0)
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
Qt(i, j). (22)
Using the random variables denoted above, the revenue earned by our policy can be expressed
as
Rev =
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjQt(i, j)1(Bt−1(i)> 0),
where Qt(i, j) can only be 1 if (i, j) is in the final assortment St offered, i.e. if pj ≥ r∗i /(2bi). We
can rewrite the above expression as
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)Qt(i, j)1(Bt−1(i)> 0) +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2bi
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
Xt(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
Qt(i, j)1(Bt−1(i)> 0)
=
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
1(Bt−1(i)> 0)
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)Qt(i, j) +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2bi
(bi−BT (i))
where we have recursively used the inventory updating rule in (22) to simplify the second term.
Now, for all i and t, Bt−1(i) is independent of any events which occur at time t. Therefore, the
expectation of the our policy’s revenue can be decomposed as
E[Rev] =
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Pr[Bt−1(i)> 0]
∑
S∈S
E[At(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)Qt(i, j)] +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2
(1− E[BT (i)]
bi
)
where we have also used the linearity of expectation. We subsequently derive the following:
E[Rev]≥
n∑
i=1
Pr[BT (i)> 0]
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
x∗t (S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)E[Qt(i, j)|S˜t = S] +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2
(1− E[BT (i)]
bi
)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr[BT (i)> 0]
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
x∗t (S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S,pj≥r∗i /(2bi)
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)qt(i, j,S) +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2
(1− E[BT (i)]
bi
)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr[BT (i)> 0]
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
x∗t (S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
(pj − r
∗
i
2bi
)qt(i, j,S) +
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2
(1− E[BT (i)]
bi
)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr[BT (i)> 0]
(
r∗i −
r∗i
2bi
(bi)
)
+
n∑
i=1
r∗i
2
(1− E[BT (i)]
bi
)
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We explain each inequality. The first inequality holds because BT (i) is the remaining inventory
of item i at the very end, which is no greater than any Bt−1(i). The second inequality holds by
Assumption 1, where for any (i, j) ∈ S˜t that was not discarded in the final assortment shown, the
purchase probability cannot be less than qt(i, j, S˜t). The third inequality holds because we are only
introducing negative terms (with pj < r
∗
i /(2bi)) into the sum. The final inequality holds by the
definition of r∗i in the policy, and the fact that the inventory constraint (6) in the LP is satisfied.
The final expression equals
∑n
i=1
r∗i
2
(1 + Pr[BT (i) > 0] − E[BT (i)]/bi), where Pr[BT (i) > 0] ≥
E[BT (i)]/bi, since random variable BT (i) is bounded from above by bi. Substituting in OPTLP =∑n
i=1 r
∗
i completes the proof of the theorem. 
4.1. Alternate Policies for Large Inventories
Our policies for large inventory and non-stationary demand, in Definitions 5–6, scale the LP solution
by a factor of 1 − δ, where δ is a small “reservation” probability. δ is selected to balance two
factors. First, it is small enough such that if we never stock out, then earning (1 − δ) · OPTLP
is an asymptotically-optimal ratio. On the other hand, δ is large enough such that we stock out
with probability at most 1/b. This intuition is motivated by a tutorial of Anupam Gupta (Gupta
2009), where they introduced the original work of Hajiaghayi et al. (2007). We improve the bounds
in the original paper, so that our bound only depends on b, but not on T . We also generalize to
fractional-demand consumption and assortments.
We first formalize our intuition that we reserve inventory by offering the highest price. The
following lemma suggests that it is better to offer the highest price than to sell nothing at all (if
there were such an option). Let Ja,t(c) denote the expected revenue from a randomized calendar
a if we are endowed with c units of inventory at the beginning of period t. Here a describes a
randomized calendar that offers price pj in time period t with probability atj. Its expectation is
taken over future demand randomness. We will also use Ja to denote the revenue that a calendar
a can earn through the entire selling horizon, if the initial inventory is clear from its context.
Lemma 6. Without loss of generality let p1 denote the highest price. A calendar that, with pos-
itive probability, does not sell anything (if there were such an option) can be improved. Specifi-
cally, if there is a calendar aˆ that offers price pj in time period t with probability aˆtj, such that
∃t, s.t.∑mj=1 aˆtj < 1, then there exists a corresponding calendar a that offers price pj in time period
t with probability atj:
at1 = aˆt1 + 1−
m∑
j=1
aˆtj,
atj = aˆtj, ∀j 6= 1,
(23)
such that a yields greater or equal revenue than aˆ does. That is, Jaˆ ≤ Ja.
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The proof is by induction. We defer it to Section EC.7.
Now we can reserve inventory in time period t by selling the highest price. We use this idea to
prove Theorems 5–6. The proof of Theorem 5 is in the general [0,1]-demand setting. The {0,1}-
demand setting is a special case of it.
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove this theorem, we first compare to another calendar aˆ: for each
time period t, offer price j with probability aˆtj = (1−δ)x∗tj, and offer nothing at all with probability
δ. Using Lemma 6, we only need to show that this calendar will earn some fraction of OPTLP, as
described in Theorem 5.
Let x∗t =
∑m
j=1 qtjx
∗
tj. Denote the following random variables governing a sample path of our
static calendar:
• Bt: remaining inventory at the end of time t, with B0 = 0;
• Atj: indicator random variable for whether price j is offered at time t. This random variable
is equal to 1 with probability aˆtj;
• Qtj: the inventory that customer would have demanded if we offers price pj in period t, which
can take any value in [0,1].
• Qt: the inventory at time t that customer would have demanded, which can take any value in
[0,1]. If we let at ∈ [m] be the price index that the randomized policy chooses, then E[Qt] =∑m
j=1E[Qtj |Atj = at ] =
∑m
j=1 qtx
∗
t ;
• min{Qt,Bt−1}: the actual sales at time t.
The total revenue earned by calendar aˆ can be calculated as
Jaˆ =
T∑
t=1
(
m∑
j=1
pjAtj min{Qtj,Bt−1}
)
.
In expectation, the proposed calendar would obtain
E[Jaˆ] =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
pjatjE[min{Qtj,Bt−1}]
≥
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
pjatjE[min{Qtj,Bt−1} |Bt > 0] ·Pr[Bt > 0]
≥
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
pjatjE[Qtj]Pr[BT > 0]
=Pr[BT > 0](1− δ)
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
qtjpjx
∗
tj
=Pr[BT > 0](1− δ)OPTLP
(24)
The first equality is because our choice of Atj, the demand Qtj, and inventory Bt−1 are independent.
The first inequality is re-writing the expectation by a conditional expectation, and ignoring the
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happening of other events Bt = 0. Second inequality is because we can lower bound any Pr[Bt > 0]
by Pr[BT > 0].
We will first lower bound Pr[BT > 0], the probability that inventory never runs out through the
entire horizon. This is equal to the probability that “the total units of inventory sold should not
exceed the initial inventory b”, i.e. Pr[BT > 0] = Pr[
∑T
t=1Qt < b]. We bound it by concentration
inequality.
The expectation of total inventory sold is strictly less than the initial inventory b.
E[
T∑
t=1
Qt] =
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
qtjatj = (1− δ)
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
qtjx
∗
tj ≤ (1− δ)b < b,
where first inequality is due to Constraint (2). Since strict inequality holds, we can lower bound
Pr[BT > 0] = 1−Pr[
∑T
t=1Qt ≥ b] = 1−Pr
[∑T
t=1Qt−E[
∑T
t=1Qt]≥ b−E[
∑T
t=1Qt]
]
as follows.
Pr[BT > 0]≥ 1−Pr
[
T∑
t=1
{Qt−E[Qt]} ≥ δb
]
≥ 1− e−
(δb)2
2Var(
∑T
t=1Qt)+2/3δb ≥ 1− e− δ
2b
3 = 1− 1
b
, (25)
The first inequality is due to E[
∑T
t=1Qt]≤ (1−δ)b. Second inequality is Bernstein Inequality, where
∀t, |Qt−E[Qt]| ≤ 1, so Qt − E[Qt] is a zero-mean Bernoulli variable and almost surely bounded
by 1. Third inequality is due to Var(
∑T
t=1Qt)≤
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t (1− x∗t )≤
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t ≤ b and δ ≤ 1. This is
because if one random variable with bounded support over [0,1] has the same mean as a Bernoulli
random variable, its variance should be smaller than that of the Bernoulli random variable. Finally,
in the last equality we plug in δ=
√
3 log b
b
.
Finally putting (25) into (24) we have
E[Jaˆ]≥ (1− 1
b
)(1−
√
3 log b
b
)OPTLP = (1−
√
3 log b
b
+ o(
√
log b
b
))OPTLP
which finishes the proof. By taking b→∞ we see the calendar is asymptotically optimal. 
Proof of Theorem 6 is deferred to Section EC.8. It follows the same technique from the proof of
Theorem 5. We only need to lower bound Pr(BT (i)> 0) by 1− 1bi ≥ 1−
1
mini∈[n] bi
.
5. Single-item Pricing under Stationary, Fractional Demand
In this section, we extend our single-item pricing results in the stationary setting to fractional
demand, where the demand from offering a price j is given by an arbitrary distribution Fj(x) over
[0,1]. While we do not make any assumptions (e.g. regularity) on the demand distributions them-
selves, we require the following technical assumptions on the relationships between the different
CDF’s for the different prices.
Assumption 2. For any j, j′ ∈ [m] such that pj > pj′, Fj(x)≥ Fj′(x) holds for all x∈ [0,1].
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Notice that E[Q] =
∫
[0,1]
xdF (x). A direct implication from Assumption 2 is that: if prices are
in decreasing order p1 > p2 > ... > pm, then E[Q1]≤ E[Q2]≤ . . .≤ E[Qm]. When Qj’s are Bernoulli
random variables, E[Qj] = qj. This assumption generalizes the commonly recognized vertical dif-
ferentiation assumption. It can be further relaxed in Section EC.3, as stated in Assumption EC.1.
Assumption 3. For any j, j′ ∈ [m] such that pj > pj′, we have for all c∈ [0,1],
E[min{c,Qj}]
E[Qj]
≥ E[min{c,Qj′}]
E[Qj′ ]
.
The intuitive explanation of Assumption 3 is that the fraction of un-truncated demand E[Qj]
obtained under any truncation c is greater, if index j corresponds to a higher price. Assumption 3
can be seen as a weaker version of a stochastic dominance assumption on the hazard rates of the
distributions Fj(x),Fj′(x).
In general, Assumptions 2–3 are precisely the assumptions needed to make our analysis frame-
work from Section 3 produce the same bounds. They are equivalent, and both hold, if every demand
distribution is Binomial with the same number of trials and a price-dependent probability, as
formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that each Qj is a normalized binomial random variable
1
n
Bin(N,βj),
where N is a fixed integer and βj is a purchase probability that decreases with price. If ∀j, j′ ∈ [m]
such that pj > pj′ we have βj ≤ βj′, then Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are also equivalent, and both hold, if every demand distribution is a truncated
exponential such that for any j, j′ ∈ [m] with pj > pj′ we have λj >λj′ , given for any λ> 0 by CDF
F (x) =
1− e−λx
1− e−λ , x∈ [0,1].
Further explanation and examples of when our assumptions are satisfied, along with proofs, can
be found in Section EC.3.
5.1. Four-step Proof of Theorem 1 under [0,1]-Demand
The proof can be divided into four steps, which we will illustrate using the following example. The
example follows the explanation from Section 3.2, where there is a problem instance with T = 3 time
periods and starting inventory b= 2. Again, there are two prices, but now with arbitrary demand
distributions QH and QL with E[QH] = 1/3,E[QL] = 1. Again, the optimal LP solution suggests to
offer a higher price with index H for 1.5 time periods, and a lower price with index L for 1.5 time
periods. We assume that the demand distributions QH and QL satisfy Assumptions 2–3.
Suppose, for the purpose of analysis, that there existed a virtual price
pC =
E[QH]pH +E[QL]pL
E[QH] +E[QL]
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with CDF FC(x) = 0.5FH(x) + 0.5FL(x),∀x∈ [0,1]. Since FC(x) is right-continuous, non-decreasing,
and FC(0) = 0,FC(1) = 1, we know FC(x) is also a demand distribution. Note that E[QC] = 2/3.
We then establish the following sequence of four inequalities:
OPTLP ·
E[min{Bin(3, 2
3
),2}]
2
≤E[Rev(C;C;C)] (26)
≤E[Rev(0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H,0.5L)] (27)
≤E[Rev(H; 0.5H,0.5L;L)]. (28)
≤max{E[Rev(H;H;L)],E[Rev(H;L;L)]}. (29)
Inequality (26) relates the LP optimum to the expected revenue of a virtual calendar who always
offers pC. We can interpret the LHS as the expectation of some Binomial random variable truncated
by initial inventory, and the RHS as the expectation of an identical-mean, smaller-variance random
variable which is also truncated by initial inventory. Of course, this virtual calendar cannot actually
be offered (because the price pC with this demand distribution FC(x) does not actually exist), but
it is useful to compare to in our analysis.
Inequality (27) is true under Assumption 3. If the demand is never truncated by the amount of
remaining inventory, then offering the virtual price pC is equivalent to randomly choosing prices pH
and pL each with probability one-half. However, if there is truncation, then Assumption 3 guarantees
that the revenue from randomly choosing between the real prices pH and pL cannot be less.
Inequality (28) is true under Assumption 2. Again, if there is a positive probability that the
static policy offers a lower price before a higher price, then the policy can be improved. Finally, in
inequality (29) we pick the best of the two static policies in Definition 1.
We incorporate inequality (29) in the proof of Theorem 1, and formalize inequalities (28), (27),
and (26) in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 7. Recall that {x} := x−bxc. Suppose there are two calendars:
1. A calendar that offers in each period the same probabilistic mixture of offering two prices, i.e.
with probability α offering the higher price and 1−α offering the lower price;
2. A calendar that starts with deterministically offering the higher price for bα ·T c periods, then
in the next period offers the higher price with probability {α · T} and the lower price with
probability 1−{α ·T}, and finally switchs to offering the lower price in the last d(1−α) ·T e−1
periods.
Under Assumption 2, the expected revenue of the second calendar is no less than the expected
revenue of the first calendar.
We now formalize the notions from inequality (27):
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• Let pC = αE[QH]pH + (1−α)E[QL]pL
αE[QH] + (1−α)E[QL] , for any α∈ [0,1];
• Denote JvC ,t(b) as the expected revenue we can earn from a deterministic calendar vC , which
on each day offers pC deterministically with an associated demand distribution of FC(·), if we
start at the beginning of period t, endowed with b units of inventory—this corresponds to the
expression on line (26);
• For all α∈ [0,1], let Jvα,t(b) denote the expected revenue earned from a randomized calendar
vα, which on each day offers the higher price pH with probability α, and the lower price pL
with probability 1 − α, if we start at the beginning of period t, endowed with b units of
inventory—this corresponds to the expression on line (27).
Lemma 8. Under Assumption 3, Jvα,1(b)≥ JvC ,1(b),∀b≥ 0.
Lemma 9. Let b∈R be any positive number, T ∈N any positive integer, and b≤ T . Let {Xt}, t=
1,2, ..., T be i.i.d. random variables with bounded support over [0,1], such that
E[Xt] = b/T,∀t= 1,2, ..., T.
Let {Yt}, t= 1,2, ..., T be i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, such that
Yt =
{
1,w.p. b/T
0,o.w.
,∀t= 1,2, ..., T
Then we have
E
[
min{b,
T∑
t=1
Xt}
]
≥E
[
min{b,
T∑
t=1
Yt}
]
The proofs of Lemmas 7–9 are deferred to Section EC.10; the proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to
Section EC.11. Since the performance guarantee in Theorem 1 was best-possible for {0,1}-demand,
it is also best-possible for [0,1]-demand.
6. Numerical Results: Using Real Data from A CPG Company
At the end of each year, the CPG company requires a price calendar to be planned for the next year.
This calendar contains 52 weekly prices for each SKU. The CPG company then brings this calendar
to its channels (e.g. supermarkets) to negotiate the Price-To-Customers (PTC). Usually the CPG
company has full bargaining power, so the suggested prices are the true prices that customers will
see, with very rare violations. After the calendar is delivered to channels, the channels produce
flyers, make price tags, and put on advertisements. Customers will not see the prices until the
channels release their prices, so there is no anticipatory behavior on their part.
We use aggregated weekly sales data from the CPG company to test the performance of our
proposed policies. We use the random forest method to build prediction models that suggest a
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Table 2 Different combinations of features, and the resulting out-of-sample error rates.
Tagged price X X X X X
Seasonal industry trend (after moving average) X X X X X X
Total number of stores in the district X X X X X
Festivals and sports events X X X X
External competitor prices X X X X X
Internal competitor prices (within brand) X X X
History prices X X
Error rate (average over time periods, and different SKU’s) 32.21 21.07 21.09 19.47 19.41 19.80
distribution of demand under different prices. Then we take these distributions as inputs, and
compare the performance of our policies to some benchmarks.
We go through standard procedures to pre-process data, create features, use dummy variables
for categorical features, check their correlations, and select features using a 5-fold cross-validation.
More details about how we build the prediction model can be found in Section EC.1. The features
that ended up being selected to build the demand model include: the tagged price, external com-
petitor prices6, and some external features. These features were both approved by the management
at the CPG company as being intuitively relevant in determining demand, and also resulted in the
lowest out-of-sample prediction errors—see Table 2.
Note that this list includes neither internal competitor prices (from other SKU’s of the CPG
company) nor historical prices. We validate our model with the following two observations, which
suggest that our model captures the real retail dynamics:
• Cross-product cannibalization is not significant. This suggests that we can do single-item
calendar pricing without considering the joint optimization problem of simultaneously deciding
all of the SKUs’ calendars.
• Inter-temporal cannibalization is not significant. This suggests that demands are not correlated
across time, in alignment with our theoretical model. A good explanation of this observation
is due to the “pantry effect” (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998, Bell et al. 1999). Even if customers
stockpile a product at promotions, this accelerates their consumption rate, and thus they end
up buying the product just as much at subsequent time periods, especially for products like
carbonated beverages and ice cream. Therefore, we model the demands to be independent
across time.
A representative SKU7 in our data set has valid weekly data over 3 years in the past. We fix the
feasible price set for each SKU to be the prices from its historical data. The planning horizon is
6 We do not know the true competitor prices, but we can use ARIMA to predict competitor prices; by substituting
true competitor prices with predicted competitor prices we find the prediction accuracy evaluated on testing set are
consistent. So we use predicted competitor prices instead of true competitor prices.
7 An SKU that is representative usually satisfies the following: (i) very little missing data, and prediction error is
small (ii) wide enough price range, i.e. in practice the demand under different prices are usually on the same order,
so if a price range is narrow then the revenue differences are relatively very small
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one year ≈ 52 weeks. We normalize demands to take [0,1] values by dividing the predicted demands
by highest predicted demand. We consider different scenarios where the starting inventory ranges
from 1 unit to 52 units, and analyze both stationary and non-stationary demand models.
In the stationary setting, we compute the expected revenue from our policy, the LP upper
bound, the optimal dynamic pricing policy, the myopic policy as one benchmark, and an LP-based
randomized policy as another benchmark. The results are shown in in the figures below, where we
have divided all the numbers by its corresponding LP upper bound with the same level of initial
inventory, so that the performance ratio is always between 0 and 1, with higher ratios indicating
better performance. We describe the algorithms and their performances:
Figure 2 Stationary Demand Figure 3 Non-stationary Demand
• The optimal dynamic pricing policy allows us to change prices based on realized demands. We
compute it numerically using dynamic programming. It is as good as the LP upper bound.
• The myopic policy always offers the price that earns the greatest expected revenue in the
upcoming time period, without considering inventory. In the stationary setting, the myopic
policy will select only one price over the entire horizon. It has better performance as the total
units of initial inventory increases, because the inventory vs. revenue trade-off tends to favor
immediate revenue as initial inventory increases.
• The LP-based benchmark first solves DLP-S. Then in each period, it offers price H with
probability x∗H/T , and L with probability x
∗
L/T , as suggested by Lemma 1. This randomized
policy can be interpreted as a convex combination of 2T deterministic calendars, and our
calendar from Definition 1 is among the best calendars of them. The LP-based benchmark
has better performances when the total units of initial inventory is either very small or very
big. When inventory is very small, with high probability it suggests a calendar that offers the
highest prices, which is almost what the best policy would suggest. Similarly, when inventory
is very big, with high probability it suggests the prices that earn the highest expected revenue.
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• ALG1 is our proposed policy from Definition 1. Although it may not be the best over all
calendars8 (since we are not solving for the best one), our heuristic still has very good perfor-
mance. We can see that it performs almost as well as the optimal dynamic pricing policy no
matter what level of initial inventory. It also achieves a 4− 5% increase in expected revenue
when inventory is of moderate size, compared to the LP-based benchmark.
In the non-stationary setting, we compute the expected revenue from our 1/2-thresholding policy,
our alternate policy for large inventory, the LP upper bound, the optimal dynamic pricing policy,
the myopic policy as one benchmark, and an LP-based randomized policy as another benchmark.
Again, in the figure we normalize all the performances to be in [0,1]. Due to the parameters
estimated in the non-stationary setting, all of the policies are close to the LP upper bound.
• The Optimal DP policy is computed numerically using dynamic programming. It is always as
good as the LP upper bound when inventory is very small or very big. But when inventory
is moderate, even the optimal dynamic pricing policy is bounded away from the LP upper
bound. This is because the LP has the benefit of consistency, which is highly relevant under
non-stationary demand.
• The myopic policy always offers the price that earns the greatest expected revenue in the
upcoming time period. In the non-stationary setting, the myopic policy may select differ-
ent prices over time. Again, it has better performance as the total units of initial inventory
increases, because the inventory vs. revenue trade-off tends to favor immediate revenue.
• The LP-Solution first solves DLP-N. Then in period t, it offers each price pj with probability
x∗tj, which is an optimal solution of DLP-N. Similarly here, this LP-based benchmark has
better performances when the total units of initial inventory is either very small or very big.
• ALG2 is our proposed policy from Definition 3. Its performance is very close to that of the
optimal dynamic pricing policy when inventory is of moderate size. When inventory is either
small or big, it fails to perform better than the LP-based benchmark, due to its “reservation”
nature. It earns a ∼ 1% increase in expected revenue when inventory is of moderate size.
• ALG3 is our proposed policy from Definition 5. Its performance is similar to that of the
LP-based benchmark, but slightly better when inventory is small (because it hides away
inventory with probability δ), and slightly worse when inventory is large (for the same reason).
Nonetheless, it is still asymptotically optimal.
We would like to point out that in practice, it is rare for the initial inventory level to be very
small or very large, since it would have been pre-optimized to sell out exactly. And when inventory
8 We note that the best deterministic calendar in theory would incorporate all of the feasible prices, but nonetheless
our calendar performs almost as well using two prices; in fact it performs almost as well as the best dynamic policy.
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is of moderate size, our policies outperform the existing benchmarks, under both the stationary
and non-stationary demand settings.
In fact, if we look into the prediction model, the expected demand is around 0.2∼ 0.6 in each
day under different prices, which corresponds to the dip when inventory b is around 10∼ 30. Note
that the time horizon is T = 52 weeks. So the expected units sold per week b/T roughly meets
the expected demand 0.2 ∼ 0.6. This is the region where the pricing problem is non-trivial in
theory, and most common in practice. When the inventory level is such that the problem falls into
degenerate cases, i.e. either b/T < 0.2 or b/T > 0.6, we see that all the curves are close to the LP
upper bound.
7. Conclusions
We proposed a calendar pricing problem. Instead of doing dynamic pricing, where pricing decisions
are based on the realized demands in the last period, we have to prescribe a trajectory of prices
at the beginning of the entire horizon. This control policy is appreciated by a Consumer Packaged
Goods company for its operational convenience.
We considered both single-item pricing (for both {0,1}- and [0,1]- demand) and assortment
(and pricing) controls. And we show that our policies are within 1-1/e (approximately 0.63) of the
optimum under stationary (IID) demand, and 1/2 of optimum under non-stationary demand, with
both guarantees approaching 1 if the starting inventory are large. We exhibit a system of tools
for establishing best-possible performance guarantees using linear programming relaxations. These
techniques are of their own theoretical interests.
Finally, we fit the real problem faced by the CPG company into the fractional demand setting of
our model, and demonstrate on data provided by the CPG company that our simple price calendars
are effective.
There could be three streams of possible variations from this paper. If we are introducing new
products to the market, or if there is very little data to generate an accurate demand distribution,
then we should treat demand distributions as unknown. One interesting question is how we can
build a learning-while-earning model.
One possible variation is to consider strategic customers. Right now in the data we observe no
significant inter-temporal cannibalization, so we assumed no strategic customer behavior – as we
had explained using pantry effect. But it would be interesting to think about strategic customers
if we observed inter-temporal cannibalization. Especially, literature suggest that companies with
commitment power would gain advantage when there are strategic customers. Calendar pricing is
naturally such a commitment policy.
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Another possible variation is to consider oligopoly pricing. If we observed cross-SKU cannibal-
ization, then how do the incentives of different agents align with each other, and even with the
retailers that carry all competitors’ products.
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E-Companion
EC.1. Building Random Forest Model
In this section we explain in details how we build the prediction model from data. We will follow
the work flow shown in Figure 1.
We start with weekly sales data in the past 3 years. After cleaning away the missing data, we
select the top 90% SKU with respect to their sales in the past three years. We further delist the
SKUs that are newly introduced in the most recent two years. Some SKUs are already grouped
together by the company. They are similar brands sold at similar pack sizes. And the company
require that all SKUs in the same group be sold at the same price. There are 52 distinct groups
in total. We build group-specific prediction models, which means that each model can select a
different combination of features as inputs.
We derive a list of features from the data. These features include the price that this group is
tagged at, its internal competitor prices, its external competitor prices, and its history prices. The
internal competitor prices are the prices of the brands that are owned by the same company. The
external competitor prices are the prices of its true competitors, owned by its rival companies. The
features of history prices are take from the past week to the past 3 weeks, as 3 different features.
The external features include industry seasonal trend (after moving average), total number of
stores in the district, festivals and sports events. The first two features are provided by the company,
and the rest are obtained by scripting from the Internet. We create dummy variables for festivals
and sports events to characterize categorical data.
We choose to use random forest (Liaw et al. (2002), Ferreira et al. (2015)) as the prediction model.
Random forest gives us the flexibility to use piecewise constant functions to approximate any true
demand function, possibly nonlinear ones. Then we aggregate all the features together, and conduct
feature selection and parameter tuning at the same time by using a 5-fold cross-validation. We used
stepwise backward selection to select features. In cross-validation, we evaluate each combination
based on its performance on validation set. During this procedure, we go back and forth with the
company to make sure that the features selected are interpretable. There are some sub-optimal
combinations that the company believe to make more practical sense, and we follow their advices.
See Table 2 for the reported error rates. Each column depicts a combination of features, and the
corresponding numbers are under the best parameter under this feature combination. The first
column serves as a benchmark. We omit some trivial duplicates of the same feature, but it should
be noted that some rows represent many features, e.g. festivals and sports events.
The average prediction error is reported as 19.41% percent.
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EC.2. Directly Using LP Can Be Suboptimal, Even Asymptotically
Before introducing Definitions 5–6, we mentioned that directly using LP solution can be subopti-
mal, even asymptotically as initial inventory being arbitrarily large. This motivated us to develop
Definitions 5–6 to show asymptotic optimality under large inventory case. We illustrate this point
using the following example.
Example EC.1. Let 2T be the total number of periods and b= T be the total number of initial
inventory. Let  ∈ (0,1) be some small positive number. Let there be two prices: p1 = 1/2, p2 = 1.
During day 1 through day T , the purchase probability of offering the higher price p1 is 0; and
the purchase probability of offering the lower price p2 is 1− . During day T + 1 through 2T , the
purchase probabilities of offering both prices are :
Prices Period 1 . . . Period T Period T+1 . . . Period 2T
p1 0 . . . 0  . . . 
p2 1−  . . . 1−   . . . 
DLP-N suggests that we offer the lower price p2 during the first T periods, then the higher
price p1 for the last T periods, i.e. ∀1≤ t≤ T,x∗t1 = 0, x∗t2 = 1;∀T + 1≤ t≤ 2T,x∗t1 = 1, x∗t2 = 0. The
objective value of the linear program is OPTLP = T (1− ) +T · 12 = T (1− + 1 ).
Let Bt denote the remaining inventory at the end of period t. By simply using the DLP-N
solution as a calendar, the expected revenue is upper bounded by
Rev≤T (1− ) +Pr(BT > 0) 1
2
T
≤T (1− ) + (T ) 1
2
T
=T (1− +T )
where the first inequality is to crudely bound the revenue earned from the later half; the second
inequality is due to union bound.
For any T , even very large T , we can pick  < 1/T so that the ratio of
Rev
OPTLP
≤ 1− +T
1− + 1

< 1
can be arbitrarily bad. This example suggests that simply using the optimal solution from LP is a
bad idea, even asymptotically.
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EC.3. Further Justification of Assumptions 2–3
In this section we provide further explanation of Assumptions 2–3. Throughout this section we
assume that the prices are sorted in decreasing order, i.e. p1 > p2 > ... > pm. This is without any
loss of generality.
Technically, Assumption 2 can be further relaxed to the following assumption:
Assumption EC.1 (relaxation of Assumption 2). For any j, j′ ∈ [m], either Fj(x)≥ Fj′(x)
for all x∈ [0,1], or Fj(x)≤ Fj′(x) for all x∈ [0,1].
This is because the coupling argument (involving Uτ ) from the last paragraph in the proof of
Lemma EC.7 still holds, though with another direction QH,τ ≥ QH,τ . Then due to symmetry,
Lemma EC.2 still holds.
Assumption 3 is a supplement to Assumption 2. We illustrate when Assumption 3 is satisfied,
and the relationship between these assumptions through the following examples.
Proposition EC.1 (equivalent statement of Assumption 3). Assumption 3 holds if and
only if ∀j < j′, c∈ [0,1], ∫
[0,c]
1−Fj(x)dx∫
[0,c]
1−Fj′(x)dx ≥
∫
[c,1]
1−Fj(x)dx∫
[c,1]
1−Fj′(x)dx.
Proof. ∀j < j′, c∈ [0,1], we have
E[Qj]
E[Qj′ ]
≤ E[min{c,Qj}]
E[min{c,Qj′}] ⇔
E[max{Qj − c,0}]
E[Qj]
≤ E[max{Qj′ − c,0}]
E[Qj′ ]
From integration by part, as a corollary of Fubini’s theorem, we have
E[max{Qj − c,0}] =
∫
[c,1]
x− cdFj(x) = (1− c)−
∫
[c,1]
Fj(x)dx=
∫
[c,1]
1−Fj(x)dx
and similarly
E[Qj] =
∫
[0,1]
1−Fj(x)dx
Subtracting
∫
[c,1]
1−Fj(x)dx from
∫
[0,1]
1−Fj(x)dx we finish the proof. 
EC.3.1. Two Examples Revisited
Here we revisit the two examples shown before.
Example EC.2. Let us restrict ourselves to truncated exponential distributions with bounded
support on [0,1], whose CDF can be written as
F (x) =
1− e−λx
1− e−λ ,∀x∈ [0,1].
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Assumption 2 states that ∀j < j′,∀x ∈ [0,1],Fj(x) ≥ Fj′(x), which is equivalent to 1−e
−λjx
1−e−λj ≥
1−e−λj′x
1−e−λj′
. If we think of F (x) as a function of λ, we take derivatives:
dF (x)
dλ
=
λ(e−λx− e−λ)
(1− e−λ)2 ≥ 0,
to find that F (x) is non-decreasing in λ, for all x ∈ [0,1]. So Assumption 2 holds if and only if
λj ≥ λj′ .
Assumption 3 states that ∀j < j′, c ∈ [0,1], E[Qj ]E[Qj′ ] ≤
E[min{c,Qj}]
E[min{c,Qj′}]
. Notice that E[X] =
1
λ
,E[min{c,X}] = 1−e−λc
λ(1−e−λ) . So we have
E[Qj]
E[Qj′ ]
≤ E[min{c,Qj}]
E[min{c,Qj′}] ⇐⇒
λj′
λj
≤ λj′
λj
1−e−λjc
λj(1−e−λj )
1−e−λj′c
λj′ (1−e
−λj′ )
⇐⇒ Fj′(x)≤ Fj(x)
So Assumption 3 holds if and only if Assumption 2 holds.
For truncated exponential distributions, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 are equivalent, and
both equivalent to λj ≥ λj′ ,∀j < j′.
Example EC.3. Let us restrict ourselves to normalized binomial distributions that have the
same number of coin flips, i.e. 1
n
Bin(N,βj), where n denotes the total number of coin flips, and
βj denotes the probability of head-ups. We normalize it by N so that this is a proper distribution
with bounded support within [0,1].
Assumption 2 states that ∀j < j′,∀x∈ [0,1],Fj(x)≥ Fj′(x), which is equivalent to βj ≤ βj′ . From
Proposition 1 (whose proof comes right after) we know that βj ≤ βj′ ensures Assumption 3 to hold.
This example illustrates that for binomial distributions that have the same number of coin flips,
Assumption 2 implies Assumption 3.
(a) Example EC.2: CDF for truncated exponentials (b) Example EC.3: CDF for normalized binomials
These two examples show that sometimes Assumption 2 is equivalent to Assumption 3.
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EC.3.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. We check it by using Proposition EC.1. Notice that Qj and Qj′ only
have finite supports over Λ = {0,1, ..., n}. If Assumption 3 holds for all c ∈ Λ, then since both
enumerator and denominator are linearly changing in c ∈ [0,1]− Λ, we know Assumption 3 also
holds for all c∈ [0,1]. So it only suffices to check when Assumption 3 holds for c∈Λ.
Assumption 2 suggests ∀j < j′, βj ≤ βj′ . So for any ∀l ∈ {0,1, ..., n− 1},(
βj(1−βj′)
β′j(1−βj)
)l
≥
(
βj(1−βj′)
β′j(1−βj)
)l+1
.
Then both multiply
(
1−βj
1−βj′
)n
we have ∀l ∈ {0,1, ..., n− 1},
C lnβ
l
j(1−βj)n−l
C lnβ
l
j′(1−βj′)n−l
≥ C
l+1
n β
l+1
j (1−βj)n−l−1
C l+1n β
l+1
j′ (1−βj′)n−l−1
.
Summing up together we have ∀l0 ∈ {0,1, ..., n− 1},
1−Fj(l0)
1−Fj′(l0) =
∑n
l=l0
C lnβ
l
j(1−βj)n−l∑n
l=l0
C lnβ
l
j′(1−βj′)n−l
≥
∑n
l=l0+1
C lnβ
l
j(1−βj)n−l∑n
l=l0+1
C lnβ
l
j′(1−βj′)n−l
=
1−Fj(l0 + 1)
1−Fj′(l0 + 1) .
Finally we have ∀l0 ∈ {0,1, ..., n− 1},∑l0
l=0 1−Fj(l)∑l0
l=0 1−Fj′(l)
≥
∑n
l=l0+1
1−Fj(l)∑n
l=l0+1
1−Fj′(l) ,
which is in the summation form, due to discreteness. And we have shown that
E[Qj ]
E[Qj′ ]
≤ E[min{c,Qj}]E[min{c,Qj′}] .

EC.3.3. Necessity of Assumptions 2–3 Through Examples
We show an example that does not satisfy Assumption 2 and breaks Lemma 7.
Example EC.4. Let there be T = 2 periods and b= 1 unit of initial inventory. Let ∈ (0,1) be
some small positive number. Let there be two prices: p1 = 1 + , p2 = 1. Demand at the higher price
p1 is deterministically 1/2− ; and demand at the lower price p2 is 1 with probability 1/2, and 2
with probability 1/2.
DLP-S suggests that we offer both prices p1 and p2 for one period, since that uses up the
b = 1 inventory exactly in expectation. Indeed, if we ignore the  terms, Rev(H;L) ≈ 3/4; and
Rev(0.5H,0.5L; 0.5H0.5L)≈ 13/16> 3/4. So Inequality (28) and Lemma 7 break down.
Notice that Lemma 8 holds if and only if Assumption 3 holds. So if Assumption 3 does not hold
then Lemma 8 fails.
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EC.4. Inequalities Involving Truncations
Lemma EC.1. ∀c,x, y≥ 0,
min{c,x}+ min{c, y} ≥min{c,x+ y}
Proof. We prove by discussing all the possibilities. If c≤min{x, y}, then following from c≥ 0
we know that min{c,x}+ min{c, y}= c+ c≥ c= min{c,x+ y}.
If min{x, y} ≤ c≤max{x, y}, then following from x, y≥ 0 we know that min{c,x}+ min{c, y}=
min{x, y}+ c≥ c= min{c,x+ y}.
If c≥max{x, y} then we know that min{c,x}+ min{c, y}= x+ y≥min{c,x+ y}. 
Lemma EC.2. For any p > 0, c ≥ 0, x ≥ w ≥ 0, z ≥ y ≥ 0, if J is differentiable, J(0) = 0,0 ≤
J ′(u)≤ p, and J is a concave function, then the following holds:
0≤− pmin{c,w+ y}+ pmin{c,w+ z}
+ pmin{c,x+ y}− pmin{c,x+ z}
−J((c−w− y)+) +J((c−w− z)+)
+J((c−x− y)+)−J((c−x− z)+)
Proof. We prove by enumerating all the possibilities. If c≤w+ y, then 0≤ 0 we are done.
If w+ y ≤ c≤min{w+ z,x+ y}, then it suffices to show that 0≤ p(c−w− y)− J(c−w− y),
which is proved by J(c−w− y) = ∫ c−w−y
0
J ′(u)du≤ ∫ c−w−y
0
pdu= p(c−w− y).
If min{w + z,x + y} ≤ c ≤ max{w + z,x + y}, without loss of generality we assume w + z ≤
x+ y. So it suffices to show that 0 ≤ p(z − y) + J(c−w − z)− J(c−w − y), which is proved by
J(c−w− y) = ∫ c−w−y
0
J ′(u)du≤ ∫ c−w−z
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−w−y
c−w−z pdu= J(c−w− z) + p(z− y).
If max{w+z,x+y} ≤ c≤ x+z, it suffices to show that J(c−w−z)+J(c−x−y)+p(x+z−c)≥
J(c−w− y). Since J is concave, J ′ is non-increasing.
J(c−w− z) +J(c−x− y) + p(x+ z− c)
=
∫ c−w−z
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−x−y
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−w−y
2c−w−x−y−z
pdu
≥
∫ c−w−z
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−x−y
0
J ′(u+ (c−w− z))du+
∫ c−w−y
2c−w−x−y−z
pdu
=
∫ c−w−z
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ 2c−w−x−y−z
c−w−z
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−w−y
2c−w−x−y−z
pdu
≥
∫ c−w−z
0
J ′(u)du+
∫ 2c−w−x−y−z
c−w−z
J ′(u)du+
∫ c−w−y
2c−w−x−y−z
J ′(u)du
=J(c−w− y)
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where the first inequality is due to concavity of J ; second inequality due to J ′(u)≤ p.
Finally if c≥ x+ z, it suffices to show that 0≤−J(c−w− y) + J(c−w− z) + J(c− x− y)−
J(c−x− z), which is due to concavity of J . 
EC.5. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. The idea is to exchange a pair of two consecutive prices. Given any calendar
v = (v1, v2, ..., vT ), if there exists t∈ [T −1], such that pvt < pvt+1 , we compare to another calendar:
v∗ = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt+1, vt, vt+2, ..., vT ).
Since we only exchange this pair of two prices, the change of expected revenue comes only from these
two periods: Before t the expected revenue is trivially not changed. Since under both calendars,
the distribution of total units of inventory consumed during t and t+ 1 are exactly the same, we
know that the distribution of initial inventory at the beginning of t+ 2 will also be the same. So
from period t+ 2 the revenue will not be changed, neither.
Let A(c, t) denote the event “c units of inventory left at the beginning of period t”.
E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v]
=
b∑
i=0
Pr(A(c, t))E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v |A(c, t) ]
=
b∑
i=2
Pr(A(c, t))(qvtpvt + qvt+1pvt+1) +Pr(A(1, t))(qvtpvt + (1− qvt)qvt+1pvt+1) +Pr(A(0, t))0
≤
b∑
i=2
Pr(A(c, t))(qvtpvt + qvt+1pvt+1) +Pr(A(1, t))(qvt+1pvt+1 + (1− qvt+1)qvtpvt) +Pr(A(0, t))0
=E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗]
The inequality holds because pvt < pvt+1 . By putting back the expected revenue from periods 1 to
t− 1 and periods t+ 2 to T we finish the proof. 
EC.6. Proof of Lemma 4
For the ease of notations we give the following definition, of a calendar with only two prices. We
abuse the notations, so that vt,∀t∈ [T ] is no longer a price index from {1,2, ...,m}, but a probability
between [0,1]. It is the probability to offer the higher price under two-price randomized calendars.
Definition EC.1. With a little abuse of notation, we denote a two-price randomized calendar
as
(v1, v2, ..., vT )∈ [0,1]T ,
which, during period t, flips a coin with probability vt to offer the higher price pH, and probability
(1− vt) to offer the lower price pL.
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Lemma EC.3. In any two-price randomized calendar v, if two consecutive probabilities vt, vt+1
are such that vt < vt+1, then probabilities vt, vt+1 can be exchanged in the calendar without decreas-
ing its expected revenue.
Proof. Again, the idea is to exchange a pair of two consecutive probabilities. Given any calendar
v = (v1, v2, ..., vT ), if ∃t∈ [T ], such that vt < vt+1, we compare to another calendar:
v∗ = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt+1, vt, vt+2, ..., vT ).
Since we only exchange this pair of two prices, the expected revenue change comes only from these
two periods: Before t the expected revenue is trivially not changed. Since under both calendars,
the distribution of total units of inventory consumed during t and t+ 1 are exactly the same, we
know that the distribution of initial inventory at the end of t+ 1 will also be the same. So after
period t+ 1 the revenue will not be changed, neither.
Let A(c, t) denote the event “c units of initial inventory left at the beginning of period t”. Then
conditioning on A(1, t) we have:
E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗ |A(c, t) ]−E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗ |A(c, t) ]
=vt+1qHpH + vt+1(1− qH)(vtqHpH + (1− vt)qLpL) + (1− vt+1)qLpL + (1− vt+1)(1− qL)(vtqHpH + (1− vt)qLpL)
−{vtqHpH + vt(1− qH)(vt+1qHpH + (1− vt+1)qLpL) + (1− vt)qLpL + (1− vt)(1− qL)(vt+1qHpH + (1− vt+1)qLpL)}
=qHqL(vt+1pL + vtpH)− qHqL(vtpL + vt+1pH)≥ 0
Conditioning on A(c, t),∀c≥ 2, we have:
E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗ |A(c, t) ]−E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗ |A(c, t) ] = 0
Now we know E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗]≥E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v∗].
By adding up the expected revenue from periods 1 to t− 1 and periods t+ 2 to T we finish the
proof. 
Corollary EC.1. There exists an optimal two-price randomized calendar whose probabilities
are non-increasing over time, i.e. vt ≥ vt+1,∀t∈ [T − 1].
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma EC.3. We can start from any calendar and use a finite
number (no more than T !) of exchange operations to achieve the optimal non-increasing structure.

Lemma EC.4. In any two-price randomized calendar v, if two consecutive probabilities vt,
vt+1 are such that vt ≥ vt+1, vt < 1, vt+1 > 0, then the last pair of probabilities indexed by t =
supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1} can be changed from (vt, vt+1) to (vt + δ, vt+1− δ) where 0≤
δ≤max{1− vt, vt+1}, without decreasing its expected revenue.
e-companion to Author: Dynamic Pricing under a Static Calendar ec9
Proof. The idea is to conduct pairwise modification to achieve a larger revenue. Given any
calendar v = (v1, v2, ..., vn), where v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ...≥ vT . If ∃t ∈ [T − 1], such that vt < 1, vt+1 > 0, vt ≥
vt+1, we compare to another calendar:
v∗(k,T ) = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt + δ, vt+1− δ, vt+2, ..., vT )
where t = supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1} and 0 ≤ δ ≤ min{1− vt, vt+1}. Observe that t is
the largest element from the set, which indicates that ∀τ ≥ t+ 2, vτ = 0. Since we are changing
probabilities from period t, the expected revenue does not change before period t.
Let A(c, τ) denote the event “c units of inventory left at the beginning of period τ”. The following
calculation and discussion is a little involved.
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v]
=
b∑
i=T−t+2
Pr(A(c, t))E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]
+
T−t+1∑
i=2
Pr(A(c, t))E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]
+Pr(A(1, t))E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(1, t) ]
(EC.1)
Case 1: ∀c∈ [n− t+ 2, b] there are too many inventory that never run out. So that
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]
=
T∑
τ=t
E[Revenue at τ under v]
=vtqHpH + (1− vt)qLpL︸ ︷︷ ︸
on day t
+vt+1qHpH + (1− vt+1)qLpL︸ ︷︷ ︸
on day t+1
+(T − t− 1)pLqL︸ ︷︷ ︸
last T-t-1 days
=E[Revenue from t and onwards under v∗ |A(c, t) ]
Case 2: ∀c ∈ [2, T − t+ 1] there is enough inventory for periods t and t+ 1. But inventory may
run out during the later periods where we offer low prices.
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]
=
T∑
τ=t
E[Revenue at τ under v]−
T−t+1−i∑
j=1
pLjPr(sell (i+ j) units out of (T − t+ 1) under v)
=
T∑
τ=t
E[Revenue at τ under v∗]−
T−t+1−i∑
j=1
pLjPr(sell (i+ j) units out of (T − t+ 1) under v)
(EC.2)
The first equality holds because we double counted the sold items which could have been on
shortages. Since shortages only happen when we sell at low price, we substract such sales from
period t+2 and onwards, a total of T − t−1 candidate periods. The second equality holds because
the first term is equal.
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Then we dive into the probabilities. This probability is equal to the sum of four mutually exclusive
probabilities: select periods t and t+1, and then select (i+ j−2) periods out of the last (n− t−1)
periods; select period t but not t+ 1, and then select (i+ j− 1) periods out of the last (n− t− 1)
periods (if j ≤ n− t− i); select period t+ 1 but not t, and then select (i+ j− 1) periods out of the
last (n− t−1) periods (if j ≤ n− t− i); finally, select neither t nor t+ 1, and then select (i+ j−1)
periods out of the last (n− t− 1) periods (if j ≤ n− t− 1− i). If j ≤ n− t− 1− i we have the
following:
Pr(sell (i+j) out of (T-t+1) |v )
=Pr(sell at t under v)Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v)Ci+j−2T−t−1(qL)
i+j−2(1− qL)T−t+1−i−j+
(1−Pr(sell at t under v))Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v)Ci+j−1T−t−1(qL)i+j−1(1− qL)T−t−i−j+
Pr(sell at t under v)(1−Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v))Ci+j−1T−t−1(qL)i+j−1(1− qL)T−t−i−j+
(1−Pr(sell at t under v))(1−Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v))Ci+jT−t−1(qL)i+j(1− qL)T−t−1−i−j
=Pr(sell at t under v)Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v)
[
Ci+j−2T−t−1(qL)
i+j−2(1− qL)T−t+1−i−j
−2Ci+j−1T−t−1(qL)i+j−1(1− qL)T−t−i−j +Ci+jT−t−1(qL)i+j(1− qL)T−t−1−i−j
]
+
(Pr(sell at t under v) + Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v))Ci+j−1T−t−1(qL)
i+j−1(1− qL)T−t−i−j+
(1−Pr(sell at t under v)−Pr(sell at t+ 1 under v))Ci+jT−t−1(qL)i+j(1− qL)T−t−1−i−j
But if j = n− t− i we do not have the third term; if j = n− t+ 1 we do not have the second term.
Either way, the underlined term is the only source of differences when we change from v to v∗.
T−t+1−i∑
j=1
pLj [Pr(sell (i+j) out of (T-t+1) |v )−Pr(sell (i+j) out of (T-t+1) |v∗ )]
=(δ(vt− vt+1) + δ2)(qL− qH)2
[
T−t+1−i∑
j=1
pLjC
i+j−2
T−t−1(qL)
i+j−2(1− qL)T−t+1−i−j
+
T−t−i∑
j=1
pLj(−2)Ci+j−1T−t−1(qL)i+j−1(1− qL)T−t−i−j +
T−t−1−i∑
j=1
pLjC
i+j
T−t−1(qL)
i+j(1− qL)T−t−1−i−j
]
=(δ(vt− vt+1) + δ2)(qL− qH)2
pLCi−1T−t−1(qL)i−1(1− qL)T−t−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=1
+2pLC
i
T−t−1(qL)
i(1− qL)T−t−1−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=2
+ (−2)pLCiT−t−1(qL)i(1− qL)T−t−1−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=1
+
T−t−1−i∑
j=1
((j+ 2)pL + (−2)(j+ 1)pL + jpL)Ci+jT−t−1(qL)i+j(1− qL)T−t−1−i−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
telescoping three summations

=(δ(vt− vt+1) + δ2)(qL− qH)2 pLCi−1T−t−1(qL)i−1(1− qL)T−t−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=1
≥ 0
(EC.3)
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We explain the equalities above. The first equality holds from Pr(sell at t and t+ 1 under v)−
Pr(sell at t and t+ 1 under v∗) = (δ(vt − vt+1) + δ2)(qL − qH)2. The second equality holds by
telescoping. The third holds because the telescoped terms cancel with only one term left.
Putting expression (EC.3) back to expression (EC.2) we obtain
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]≤E[Revenue from t and onwards under v∗ |A(c, t) ]
for all c∈ [2, n− t+ 1].
Case 3: Finally, let us do some similar analysis for c= 1:
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(1, t) ]
=(vtqHpH + (1− vt)qLpL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[Revenue|Sold at t ]
+(vt(1− qH) + (1− vt)(1− qL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(Not sold at t)
(vt+1qHpH + (1− vt+1)qLpL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[Revenue|Sold at t+1 ]
+ (vt(1− qH) + (1− vt)(1− qL))(vt+1(1− qH) + (1− vt+1)(1− qL))J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1)
=(vt + vt+1)qHpH + (2− vt− vt+1)qLpL− (vtqH + (1− vt)qL)(vt+1qHpH + (1− vt+1)qLpL)
+
[
(1− qL)2 + (1− qL)(vt + vt+1)(qL− qH) + vtvt+1(qL− qH)2
]
J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1)
Only the underline parts are going to change if we change from v to v∗. Here J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1) represent
the expected revenue if we are endowed with 1 unit of inventory at the beginning of time period
t+ 2, and keep offering pL for the remaining periods. Replacing (vt, vt+1) with (vt + δ, vt+1− δ) we
have:
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v∗ |A(1, t) ]−E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(1, t) ]
=δ(qHpHqL− qLpLqH)− δ(vt− vt+1)(qLpL− qHpH)(qL− qH) + δ2(qL− qH)(qLpL− qHpH)
− (δ(vt− vt+1)(qL− qH)2 + δ2(qL− qH)2)J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1)
=δqHqL(pH− pL)− δ(vt− vt+1 + δ)(qL− qH)
[
(qL− qH)J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1)− (qLpL− qHpH)
]
≥δqHqL(pH− pL)− δ(vt− vt+1 + δ)(qL− qH) [(qL− qH)pL− (qLpL− qHpH)]
=δqH(pH− pL) (qL− (vt− vt+1 + δ)(qL− qH))
=δqH(pH− pL)
(1− vt + vt+1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
qL + (vt− vt+1 + δ)qH

≥0
(EC.4)
The first inequality holds because J t+2(L,L,...,L)(1) ≤ pL. The second inequality holds
because 0 ≤ δ ≤ min{1 − vt, vt+1}, making the braced term non-negative. Due to
expression (EC.4) we know that E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(1, t) ] ≤
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v∗ |A(1, t) ].
In all, putting together the discussions in all three cases into expression (EC.1), we have shown
E[Revenue from t and onwards under v]≤E[Revenue from t and onwards under v∗]
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which finishes the proof. 
Now let us prove Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let us start from the second calendar described in Lemma 4. We will show
that by finitely applying Corollary EC.1 and Lemma EC.4 we can obtain the first calendar described
in Lemma 4, which earns a greater revenue.
First deduct from Corollary EC.1 that the randomized calendar is non-increasing. Then
by Lemma EC.4 we can change the last pair of probabilities with non-increasing order, i.e.
t = supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1}, from (vt, vt+1) to (vt + δ, vt+1 − δ) with δ = max{1 −
vt, vt+1} ≥ 0 to achieve a larger revenue. After such change, either vt = 1 or vt+1 = 0 so we know that
the total number of fractional (strictly greater than 0 and smaller than 1) periods have decreased by
1. By repeatedly applying Corollary EC.1 and Lemma EC.4 we will obtain the optimal randomized
calendar as described. 
This lemma is a key observation for the proof of Theorem 1.
EC.7. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Notice that for any prescribed parameters, if we have one extra inventory
we can earn some extra revenue. But this extra revenue will be no more than pmax, the highest
revenue that one single inventory might earn alone:
Jaˆ,t(b+ 1)≤ Jaˆ,t(b) + pmax (EC.5)
for any t∈ [T ] and b∈N.
When t= T , we know Jaˆ,T (b) = Ja,T (b)− (1−
∑m
j=1 aˆTj)qT maxpmax ≤ Ja,T (b) holds for any t∈ [T ]
and b∈N.
Suppose Jaˆ,t+1(c)≤ Ja,t+1(c) holds for any c∈N, then we have:
Jaˆ,t(b+ 1) =
m∑
j=1
aˆtj (qtj(pj +Jaˆ,t+1(b)) + (1− qtj)Jaˆ,t+1(b+ 1))
=
m∑
j=1
atj (qtj(pj +Jaˆ,t+1(b)) + (1− qtj)Jaˆ,t+1(b+ 1))
− (1−
m∑
j=1
aˆtj) (qt1(p1 +Jaˆ,t+1(b)−Jaˆ,t+1(b+ 1)) +Jaˆ,t+1(b+ 1))
≤
m∑
j=1
atj (qtj(pj +Ja,t+1(b)) + (1− qtj)Ja,t+1(b+ 1))− 0
=Ja,t(b+ 1)
where the inequality is due to (EC.5). This holds for any b ∈N. Combining Jaˆ,t(0) = 0 = Ja,t(0),
we know that Jaˆ,t(c)≤ Ja,t(c) holds for any c∈N. By induction we finish the proof. 
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EC.8. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6. Following each sample path, the revenue earned by the policy suggested
in Definition 6 can be expressed as
Rev =
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjQt(i, j)1(Bt−1(i)> 0)
=
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
1(Bt−1(i)> 0)
∑
S∈S
At(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjQt(i, j)
Taking expectation we have the following:
E[Rev]≥
n∑
i=1
Pr(BT (i)> 0)
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
(1− δ)x∗t (S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjE[Qt(i, j) |St = S ]
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr(BT (i)> 0)
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈S
(1− δ)x∗t (S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
pjqt(i, j,S)
where the first inequality is because Pr(Bt(i) > 0) ≥ Pr(BT (i) > 0), and the random variables
At(S),1(Bt−1(i) > 0) and the conditioned Qt(i, j) are independent so we can replace them with
their expectations; the second inequality holds by substitutability.
The rest of the proof follows from the proof to Theorem 5, where we can lower bound Pr(BT (i)>
0) by 1− 1
bi
≥ 1− 1
mini∈[n] bi
using Bernstein’s inequality. 
EC.9. Structural Property for Single-item Pricing under Stationary,
Fractional Demand
We establish a structural property, Lemma EC.5, as a warm-up. We note that the monotonicity
property from Lemma 3 holds irrespective of Assumptions 2–3. The structural property says:
Lemma EC.5. Under [0,1]-demand, in any calendar v, if two consecutive price indices vt, vt+1
are such that pvt < pvt+1, then indices vt and vt+1 can be exchanged in the calendar without decreas-
ing its expected revenue.
Proof of Lemma EC.5. Let (x)+ = max{x,0} denote the maximum of x and 0. Let Qvt denote
the random demand if we offer price vt on day t, which follows a distribution of Fvt(·).
Similar to the proof to Lemma 3, the idea is to exchange a pair of two consecutive prices. Given
any calendar v = (v1, v2, ..., vT ), if there exists t ∈ [T − 1], such that pvt < pvt+1 , we compare to
another calendar:
v∗ = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt+1, vt, vt+2, ..., vT ).
Since we only exchange this pair of two prices, the expected revenue change comes only from these
two periods: Before t the expected revenue is trivially not changed. Since under both calendars,
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the distribution of total units of inventory consumed during t and t+ 1 are exactly the same, we
know that the distribution of initial inventory at the end of t+ 1 will also be the same. So after
period t+ 1 the revenue will not be changed, neither.
Let A(c, t) denote the event “c units of inventory left at the beginning of period t”, where
c∈ [0, b], t∈ [T ]. Then for any c∈ [0, b], conditioning on A(c, t) we have:
E[Revenue from t and t+ 1 under v |A(c, t) ]
=pvtE [min{c,Qvt}] + pvt+1E
[
min{(c−Qvt)+,Qvt+1}
]
=(pvt − pvt+1)E [min{c,Qvt}] + pvt+1E
[
min{c,Qvt +Qvt+1}
]
where the second equation holds because min{(c − Qvt)+,Qvt+1} = min{c,Qvt + Qvt+1} −
min{c,Qvt}, and linearity of expectations.
Now let us compare the revenue from two calendars, still conditioning on A(c, t):
E[Revenue under v∗ |A(c, t) ]−E[Revenue under v |A(c, t) ]
=(pvt+1 − pvt)E
[
min{c,Qvt+1}
]
+ pvtE
[
min{c,Qvt+1 +Qvt}
]
− (pvt − pvt+1)E [min{c,Qvt}]− pvt+1E
[
min{c,Qvt +Qvt+1}
]
=(pvt+1 − pvt)(E [min{c,Qvt}] +E
[
min{c,Qvt+1}
]−E [min{c,Qvt +Qvt+1}])
≥0
where the last inequality is due to the fact that min{c,x}+ min{c, y} ≥min{c,x+ y},∀c,x, y ≥ 0,
which is proved in the appendix as Lemma EC.1. Notice that this is true for all c∈ [0, b].
Finally, by integrating over c ∈ [0, b] we know that E[Revenue under v∗] is greater than
E[Revenue under v], which finishes the proof. 
Corollary EC.2. Under [0,1]-demand, there exists an optimal static calendar whose prices
are non-increasing over time, i.e. pv∗t ≥ pv∗t+1 ,∀t∈ [T − 1].
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma EC.2. We can start from any calendar and use a finite
number (no more than T !) of exchange operations to achieve the optimal non-decreasing structure.

Notice that Lemma EC.5 and Corollary EC.2 are assumption-free.
EC.10. Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 1 under [0,1]-Demand
EC.10.1. Proof of Lemma 7, under [0,1]-Demand
Lemma EC.6. Under [0,1]-demand, in any two-price randomized calendar v, if two consecutive
probabilities vt, vt+1 are such that vt < vt+1, then probabilities vt, vt+1 can be exchanged in the
calendar without decreasing its expected revenue.
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Proof. Let (x)+ = max{x,0} denote the maximum of x and 0. Let QH,t and QL,t denote the
random demand if we offer the higher price and the lower price on day t, which follows a distribution
of FH(·) and FL(·), respectively.
Similar to the proof to Lemma EC.5, the idea is to exchange a pair of two consecutive prices.
Given any calendar v = (v1, v2, ..., vT ), if there exists t∈ [T −1], such that vt < vt+1, we compare to
another calendar:
v∗ = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt+1, vt, vt+2, ..., vT ).
Since we only exchange this pair of two prices, the expected revenue before t is trivially not changed.
Let Jv,t(c) denote the expected revenue we would earn under calendar v if we were endowed
with c units of inventory at the beginning of period t. Its expectation is taken over future demand
randomness.
Let A(c, t) denote the event “c units of inventory at the beginning of period t”, where c∈ [0, b], t∈
[T ]. Then for any c∈ [0, b], conditioning on A(c, t) we have:
Jv,t(c) =E[Revenue from t and onwards under v |A(c, t) ]
=vtE [min{c,QH,t}]pH + vtvt+1E
[
min{(c−QH,t)+,QH,t+1}
]
pH
+ vt(1− vt+1)E
[
min{(c−QH,t)+,QL,t+1}
]
pL
+ vtvt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ vt(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)E [min{c,QL,t}]pL + (1− vt)vt+1E
[
min{(c−QL,t)+,QH,t+1}
]
pH
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E
[
min{(c−QL,t)+,QL,t+1}
]
pL
+ (1− vt)vt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
Plugging in min{(c−x)+, y}= min{c,x+ y}−min{c,x},∀c,x, y≥ 0 we have:
Jv,t(c) =vtE [min{c,QH,t}]pH + vtvt+1E [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]pH
+ vt(1− vt+1)E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]pL
− vtvt+1E [min{c,QH,t}]pH− vt(1− vt+1)E [min{c,QH,t}]pL
+ vtvt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ vt(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)E [min{c,QL,t}]pL + (1− vt)vt+1E [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]pH
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]pL
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− (1− vt)vt+1E [min{c,QL,t}]pH− (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E [min{c,QL,t}]pL
+ (1− vt)vt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
Merging similar expressions we have the following:
Jv,t(c) =vt(1− vt+1)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
− (1− vt)vt+1(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
+ vtvt+1pHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ vt(1− vt+1)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (1− vt)vt+1pHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
+ vtvt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ vt(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)vt+1E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt)(1− vt+1)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
(EC.6)
Similarly we have Jv∗,t(c), the expected revenue under calendar v
∗, as following:
Jv∗,t(c) =vt+1(1− vt)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
− (1− vt+1)vt(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
+ vt+1vtpHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ vt+1(1− vt)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (1− vt+1)vtpHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (1− vt+1)(1− vt)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
+ vt+1vtE
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ vt+1(1− vt)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt+1)vtE
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt+1)(1− vt)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
(EC.7)
The equality holds because calendars v and v∗ are the same from period t+ 2.
On the other hand, we know that ∀c,x, y≥ 0,min{c,x+ y} ≥ 0 and Jv,t+2((c−x− y)+)≥ 0. Due
to Fubini’s theorem, we can exchange the double integration:
E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}] =E [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
=E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
] (EC.8)
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Then we calculate their difference, conditioning on A(c, t):
Jv∗,t(c)−Jv,t(c)
=(vt+1− vt)(pH− pL) (E [min{c,QH,t}] +E [min{c,QL,t}]−E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}])
=(vt+1− vt)(pH− pL) (E [min{c,QH,t}] +E [min{c,QL,t+1}]−E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}])
≥0
where the inequality holds because three components are all greater or equal to zero, the third
component due to Lemma EC.1. Notice that this is true for all c∈ [0, b].
Finally, by integrating over c ∈ [0, b] we know that E[Revenue under v∗] is greater than
E[Revenue under v], which finishes the proof. 
Corollary EC.3. There exists an optimal two-price randomized calendar whose probabilities
are non-increasing over time, i.e. vt ≥ vt+1,∀t∈ [T − 1].
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma EC.6. We can start from any calendar and use a finite
number (no more than T !) of exchange operations to achieve the optimal non-increasing structure.

Notice that Lemma EC.6 and Corollary EC.3 are assumption-free.
Lemma EC.7. Under Assumption 2, in any two-price randomized calendar v, if two consecutive
probabilities vt, vt+1 are such that vt ≥ vt+1, vt < 1, vt+1 > 0, then the last pair of probabilities indexed
by t= supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1} can be changed from (vt, vt+1) to (vt+δ, vt+1−δ) where
0≤ δ≤max{1− vt, vt+1}, without decreasing its expected revenue.
Proof. Let (x)+ = max{x,0} denote the maximum of x and 0. Let QH,t and QL,t denote the
random demand if we offer the higher price and the lower price on day t, which follows a distribution
of FH(·) and FL(·), respectively.
Again our idea is to modify a pair of consecutive probabilities, to achieve a greater revenue.
Given any calendar v = (v1, v2, ..., vn), where v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vT . If ∃τ ∈ [T − 1], such that vτ <
1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1, we compare to another calendar:
v∗ = (v1, v2, ..., vt−1, vt + δ, vt+1− δ, vt+2, ..., vT )
where t= supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1} and 0≤ δ ≤min{1− vt, vt+1}. Notice that t is the
largest element in this set {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1}, which indicates that ∀τ ≥ t+2, vτ = 0. Since
we are changing probabilities from period t, the expected revenue does not change before period t.
Let Jv,t(c) denote the expected revenue we would earn under calendar v if we were endowed
with c units of inventory at the beginning of period t. Its expectation is taken over future demand
randomness.
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Let A(c, t) denote the event “c units of inventory at the beginning of period t”, where c∈ [0, b], t∈
[T ]. Then for any c ∈ [0, b], conditioning on A(c, t) we can expand the expression of the expected
revenue. We proceed from equation (EC.6):
Jv∗,t(c) =(vt + δ)(1− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
− (1− vt− δ)(vt+1− δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
+ (vt + δ)(vt+1− δ)pHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (vt + δ)(1− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (1− vt− δ)(vt+1− δ)pHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (1− vt− δ)(1− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (vt + δ)(vt+1− δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (vt + δ)(1− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt− δ)(vt+1− δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (1− vt− δ)(1− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
(EC.9)
where equality holds because calendars v and v∗ are the same from period t+ 2.
Using (EC.8), we subtract (EC.9) and (EC.6) to calculate their difference, conditioning on A(c, t):
Jv∗,t(c)−Jv,t(c) =δ(1− vt+1 + vt + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
+ δ(1− vt + vt+1− δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
+ δ(vt+1− vt− δ)pHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ δ(1− vt+1 + vt + δ)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ δ(−1 + vt− vt+1 + δ)pHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
+ δ(−vt + vt+1− δ)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
+ δ(vt+1− vt− δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ δ(−vt+1 + vt + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ δ(vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ δ(−vt + vt+1− δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
Merging similar expressions we have the following:
Jv∗,t(c)−Jv,t(c)
δ
=(pH− pL){E [min{c,QH,t}] +E [min{c,QL,t}]−E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]}
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
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− (vt− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)pHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)pHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
≥(vt− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL){E [min{c,QH,t}] +E [min{c,QL,t}]
−E [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]}
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QH,t}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)(pH− pL)E [min{c,QL,t}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)pHE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)pHE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+ (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
− (vt− vt+1 + δ)E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
where the inequality holds because δ ≤ min{1 − vt, vt+1} so vt − vt+1 + δ ≤ 1, and because of
Lemma EC.1.
Further merging similar expressions, while using (EC.8) we have the following:
Jv∗,t(c)−Jv,t(c)
δ(vt− vt+1 + δ) ≥(pH− pL){2E [min{c,QH,t}]−E [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]}
− pLE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ pLE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
− pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
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−E [Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)]
+E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
−E [Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)]
≥− pLE [min{c,QH,t +QH,t+1}]
+ pLE [min{c,QH,t +QL,t+1}]
+ pLE [min{c,QL,t +QH,t+1}]
− pLE [min{c,QL,t +QL,t+1}]
−E [Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QH,t+1)+)]
+E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QH,t−QL,t+1)+)
]
+E
[
Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QH,t+1)+)
]
−E [Jv,t+2((c−QL,t−QL,t+1)+)]
where the second inequality is due to Lemma EC.1.
Now let us introduce a coupling argument: suppose Uτ , τ = t, t+ 1 are two uniform distributions
over [0,1], and let QH,τ = F
−1
H (Uτ ),QL,τ = F
−1
L (Uτ ), τ = t, t + 1. Since FH and FL are CDF’s of
distributions, they are monotone increasing, thus the inverse function exists. And for any specific
realization of Uτ , τ = t, t+ 1, we know that QH,τ ≤QL,τ , due to Assumption 2.
Now we only need to understand Jv,t+2(c) as a function of c ∈ [0, b]. Apparently Jv,t+2(0) = 0.
Let us denote the distribution of random demands in the last T − t+ 1 periods as X, whose CDF
denoted as Fˆ . X is a non-negative random variable. We sell at the lower price from period t+2, and
so the expected revenue in the last T − t+ 1 periods is calculated as Jv,t+2(c) = pLE[min{c,X}] =
pL
∫
[0,b]
min{c,u}dFˆ (u). Due to Fubini’s theorem, we can perform integration by part, and have:
Jv,t+2(c) =pL
∫
[0,b]
min{c,u}dFˆ (u)
=pL
∫
[0,c]
udFˆ (u) + pL
∫
[c,b]
cdFˆ (u)
=pL(cFˆ (c)−
∫
[0,c]
Fˆ (u)du) + pL(c− cFˆ (c))
=pL(c−
∫
[0,c]
Fˆ (u)du)
This is a differentiable function with respect to c. Taking derivative we have: J ′v,t+2(c) = pL(1−
Fˆ (c))∈ [0, pL]. Since Fˆ (c) is a CDF, thus non-decreasing, we know that J ′v,t+2(c) is non-increasing.
So Jv,t+2(c) is concave. Due to Lemma EC.2 we finish our proof. 
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Now let us prove Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let us start from the second calendar described in Lemma 7. We will show
that by finitely applying Corollary EC.3 and Lemma EC.7 we can obtain the first calendar described
in Lemma 7, which earns a greater revenue.
First deduct from Corollary EC.3 that the randomized calendar is non-increasing. Then
by Lemma EC.7 we can change the last pair of probabilities with non-increasing order, i.e.
t = supτ∈[T−1] {vτ < 1, vτ+1 > 0, vτ ≥ vτ+1}, from (vt, vt+1) to (vt + δ, vt+1 − δ) with δ = max{1 −
vt, vt+1} ≥ 0 to achieve a larger revenue. After such change, either vt = 1 or vt+1 = 0 so we know that
the total number of fractional (strictly greater than 0 and smaller than 1) periods have decreased by
1. By repeatedly applying Corollary EC.3 and Lemma EC.7 we will obtain the optimal randomized
calendar as described. 
EC.10.2. Proof of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 8. First of all, we show that ∀c≥ 0,
αE[min{c,XH}]pH + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}]pL
αE[min{c,XH}] + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}] ≥ pC =
αE[XH]pH + (1−α)E[XL]pL
αE[XH] + (1−α)E[XL] . (EC.10)
This is equivalent to showing (by subtracting pL from both sides)
E[min{c,XH}]
αE[min{c,XH}] + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}] ≥
E[XH]
αE[XH] + (1−α)E[XL] ,
which is further simplified as
E[min{c,XH}]
E[min{c,XL}] ≥
E[XH]
E[XL]
.
This is what Assumption 3 states.
Now we prove by backward induction on t. ∀c≥ 0,
Jvα,T (c) =αE[min{c,XH}]pH + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}]pL
≥pC (αE[min{c,XH}] + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}])
=JvC ,T (c)
If we can show Jvα,t+1(c)≥ JvC ,t+1(c),∀c≥ 0, then we can show:
Jvα,t(c) =αE[min{c,XH}]pH + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}]pL
+αE[Jvα,t+1(c−XH)] + (1−α)E[Jvα,t+1(c−XL)]
≥pC (αE[min{c,XH}] + (1−α)E[min{c,XL}])
+αE[JvC ,t+1(c−XH)] + (1−α)E[JvC ,t+1(c−XL)]
=JvC ,T (c)
where the inequality is due to (EC.10) and due to induction hypothesis. By induction on t we finish
our proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 9. Let FX(·) and FY (·) denote the CDF of X1 and Y1, respectively. First we
show ∀c≥ 0,
E [min{c,X1}]≥E [min{c,Y1}] . (EC.11)
This is obvious when c≥ 1, and now we focus on c < 1 case.
E [min{c,X1}] =
∫
[0,1]
min{c,x}dFX(x)
=
∫
[0,1]
xdFX(x)−
∫
[c,1]
(x− c)dFX(x)
=E[X1]−
{∫
[c,1]
xdFX(x)− c(1−FX(c))
}
=E[X1]−
{
1− cFX(c)−
∫
[c,1]
FX(x− 0+)dx− c(1−FX(c))
}
=E[X1]− (1− c) +
∫
[c,1]
FX(x)dx
where the fourth equality is due to integration by part, as a corollary of Fubini’s theorem.
Due to similar analysis, E [min{c,Y1}] = E[Y1] − (1 − c) +
∫
[c,1]
FY (x)dx. So it suffices to show∫
[c,1]
FX(x)dx≥
∫
[c,1]
FY (x)dx.
Note that
∫
[0,1]
FX(x)dx =
∫
[0,1]
FY (x)dx, that FY (x) = b/T,∀x ∈ [0,1) is a constant,
and that FX(x) is non-decreasing over x ∈ [0,1). Denote x0 to be the smallest number
from x0 = arg minx∈[0,1) {x |FX(x)≥ b/T, limu→x− FX(u)≤ b/T }. Since FX(·) is right-continuous,
limu→x+ FX(u) = FX(x).
We distinguish the following two cases. When c ≥ x0, ∀x ∈ [c,1],FX(x) ≥ FY (x). So we know∫
[c,1]
FX(x)dx≥
∫
[c,1]
FY (x)dx. When c≤ x0, ∀x∈ [0, c),FX(x)≤ FY (x). So we know
∫
[c,1]
FX(x)dx=∫
[0,1]
FX(x)dx −
∫
[0,c)
FX(x)dx ≥
∫
[0,1]
FY (x)dx −
∫
[0,c)
FY (x)dx =
∫
[c,1]
FY (x)dx. In both cases, we
have shown that ∀c≥ 0,E [min{c,X1}]≥E [min{c,Y1}].
Then we prove the desired conclusion by pairwise switching Xt into Yt. Fix τ . For any realization
of random variables except Xτ , Yτ , i.e., for any realization of Xt = xt, Yt = yt,∀t 6= τ , we have the
following:
E
[
min{b,
τ∑
t=1
Xt +
T∑
t=τ+1
Yt}
]
=E
[
min{b,
τ−1∑
t=1
xt +
T∑
t=τ+1
yt +Xτ}
]
=E
min

(
b−
τ−1∑
t=1
xt−
T∑
t=τ+1
yt
)+
,Xτ

+ min{b, τ−1∑
t=1
xt +
T∑
t=τ+1
yt
}
≥E
min

(
b−
τ−1∑
t=1
xt−
T∑
t=τ+1
yt
)+
, Yτ

+ min{b, τ−1∑
t=1
xt +
T∑
t=τ+1
yt
}
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=E
[
min{b,
τ−1∑
t=1
Xt +
T∑
t=τ
Yt}
]
where the inequality is due to (EC.11).
By repeatedly applying this above inequality we obtain our desired conclusion of
E
[
min{b,∑Tt=1Xt}]≥E[min{b,∑Tt=1 Yt}]. 
EC.11. Proof of Theorem 1 under [0,1]-Demand
Now we formalize the proof of Theorem 1 under [0,1] demand, using the above Lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 1 under [0,1]-Demand Let Jv denote the expected revenue we can earn by
using the calendar suggested by our algorithm. Notice that the optimal solution of DLP-S has only
no more than two non-zero variables. We distinguish the following two cases.
If our algorithm only selects one single price, we obtain one non-zero value, denoted as
x∗j . We let Xj to be the random demand under this price.
DLP-S has either one tight constraint or two. If it has two tight constraints yet only one non-zero
variable, this suggests that E[Xj] = b/T . the static policy from Definition 1 yields exactly
pj∗E
[
min{
T∑
t=1
Xj, b}
]
≥pj∗E [min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}]
=OPTLP∆
APX ,
where inequality is due to Lemma 9; the last equality due to OPTLP = pj∗b.
If there is only one tight constraint, the static policy from Definition 1 would offer the corre-
sponding price for all T time periods. In one case, the tight constraint is the inventory constraint
(the optimal solution has xj∗ satisfying E[Xj]xj∗ = b,xj∗ < T and all other variables being zero),
which suggests E[Xj]> b/T . Therefore, the static policy from Definition 1 yields
pj∗E
[
min{
T∑
t=1
Xj, b}
]
≥pj∗E [min{Bin(T,E[Xj]), b}]
≥pj∗E[min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}]
=OPTLP∆
APX ,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 9 and that Binomial random variable equals to the sum
of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables; the second inequality is due to E[Xj]> b/T ; the last equality
is due to OPTLP = pj∗b.
In the other case, the tight constraint is the legitimate constraint (the optimal solution has xj∗
satisfying E[Xj]xj∗ < b,xj∗ = T and all other variables being zero), which suggests E[Xj] < b/T .
Therefore, the static policy from Definition 1 yields
pj∗E
[
min{
T∑
t=1
Xj, b}
]
≥pj∗TE[Xj]E[min{Bin(T,E[Xj]), b}]
TE[Xj]
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≥pj∗TE[Xj]E[min{Bin(T, b/T ), b}]
T (b/T )
=OPTLP∆
APX ,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 9 and that Binomial random variable equals to the sum
of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables; second inequality is due to Proposition 1; last equality follows
from OPTLP = pj∗TE[Xj], because now the linear program is tight on the legitimate constraint.
If our algorithm selects two prices, we can restrict ourselves only to two-price calendars.
By solving DLP-S, we obtain two non-zero values, denoted as x∗j1 and x
∗
j2
, where j1 < j2. pj1 is the
higher price, and pj2 is the lower price. Denote Xj1 and Xj2 to be the demand under these two
prices, respectively.
If we divide x∗j1 and x
∗
j2
by T , this will naturally give us two probabilities. Denote α=
x∗j1
T
,1−α=
x∗j2
T
We use these numbers to construct a randomized calendar vα: on each day, offer the higher
price pj1 with probability α, and the lower price pj2 with probability 1− α. Using Lemma 7, we
know that the static policy from Definition 1 earns greater revenue than vα.
Jv ≥ Jvα .
Denote
pC =
αE[Xj1 ]pj1 + (1−α)E[Xj2 ]pj2
αE[Xj1 ] + (1−α)E[Xj2 ]
,
as the “average price per unit of inventory on a single day” under calendar vα, if demand is not
truncated by initial inventory. Denote FC(x) = αFj1(x)+(1−α)Fj2(x),∀x∈ [0,1]. This is a demand
distribution. Let XC,t =XC be the demand distribution of us offering price pC in period t.
We construct a virtual deterministic calendar vC , which on each day offers pC , with an associated
demand distribution of FC(·). Using Lemma 8, a coupling argument shows that the randomized
calendar vα earns greater revenue than the virtual deterministic calendar vC .
Jvα ≥ JvC .
Since constraint (2) is binding, E[XC ] = b/T . Let {Yt}, t= 1,2, ..., T be i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variables, such that
Yt =
{
1,w.p. b/T
0,o.w.
,∀t= 1,2, ..., T
We calculate the expected revenue earned from this virtual calendar. Using Lemma 9 we have:
JvC =E[min{b,
T∑
t=1
XC,t}]≥E[min{b,
T∑
t=1
Yt}].
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Putting all these inequalities together, we know
Jv ≥ Jvα ≥ JvC ≥E[min{b,
T∑
t=1
Yt}] = ∆APXOPTLP.
where the last equality is re-writing a Binomial variable as the sum of IID Bernoulli variables. This
shows that the static policy from Definition 1 achieves at least ∆APX of the OPTLP upper bound.

